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CASE NOTES
Copyrights-Indivisibility of Copyright Rule Held Inapplicable Where
Author Is Plaintiff.-In 1945, plaintiffs' testator, David Goodis, arranged with
the publishing firm of Julian Messner, Inc. for his book Dark Passage to be pub-
lished the following year. Subsequently, he sold exclusive movie rights in his
novel to Warner Brothers. The agreement with Warner Brothers was embodied
in a standard form contract, but contained several "specially negotiated" clauses
which covered television and radio performance rights. Goodis then made a
third agreement, this time with the Curtis Publishing Co., to publish the novel
in eight installments in The Saturday Evening Post just prior to the pub-
lication of Dark Passage in book form. Every issue contained a copyright
notice in the name of The Saturday Evening Post.' No notice was given in
Goodis' name. Following its publication in book form, Warner Brothers pro-
duced Dark Passage as a movie, which was shown in theaters and on televi-
sion. Warner Brothers then assigned its contract rights to defendant United
Artists, which produced a film series based on Dark Passage entitled "The
Fugitive," which was shown weekly on television by defendant American
Broadcasting Co.2 In 1965 Goodis brought an action for copyright infringe-
menL3 The district court held that Goodis' granting permission to The
Saturday Evening Post to publish a serialization of his novel, without selling
to the magazine all his rights in the book, followed by the publishing of the
serialized novel in the periodical, resulted in the dedication of all of Goodis'
rights in Dark Passage to the public domain. 4 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding unani-
mously that the publisher's copyright notice in the magazine sufficed to ac-
quire a valid copyright for the author.5 The court stressed the importance
of its initial determination that the author, in granting The Saturday Evening
Post a license to publish the serialization of his novel, did not intend to
abandon his work to the public domain." Goodis v. United Artists Television,
Inc., 425 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1970).
The importance of Goodis lies in its modification of the "judge-made"
doctrine7 called "'indivisibility of copyright' which rejects partial assign-
1. 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1964): "The copyright provided by this title shall protect all the
copyrightable component parts of the work copyrighted, and all matter therein in which
copyright is already subsisting, but without extending the duration or scope of such copy-
right. The copyright upon composite works or periodicals shall give to the proprietor thereof
all the rights in respect thereto which he would have if each part vere individually
copyrighted under this title."
2. See generally Newsweek, April 26, 1965, at 94.
3. Goodis died while the action was pending and his executors were substituted as
plaintiffs in 1967. Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc. 278 F. Supp. 122, 123 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), rev'd, 425 F2d 397 (2d Cir. 1970).
4. Id. at 125.
5. Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 399 (2d Cir. 1970).
6. Id. at 400.
7. Id.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ments of copyrights." 8 A proprietor or assignee of a copyright must possess
"nothing less than all the rights in a copyrighted work" for his copyright to
be valid and fully protected. 9 The theory of indivisibility of copyright has
been summarized as follows: "Copyright is indivisible, and unless an assign-
ment conveys all of the copyright and the rights incident thereto, it will be
treated not as an assignment of the copyright, but rather as a license." 10 The
distinction between an assignm6nt and a license is important because "assign-
ment changes the legal ownership of the copyright, while the license merely
makes the doing of certain things by the licensee lawful. . . . The ordinary
rule of law is that a licensee cannot sue, in his own name, for violation by an-
other of the rights which he has been permitted to exercise."'" A licensee
may only sue an infringer on the rights to which he has a license, 12 and then
he is required to join the owner (proprietor) of the copyright as co-plain-
tiff.18 The proprietor of the copyright can, however, be forced by an ex-
clusive licensee to become a party-plaintiff. 14 One of the practical results of the
8. Id. In England the indivisibility theory found its historical roots in Jeffreys v. Boosey,
10 Eng. Rep. 681 (1854), and, in the United States, in Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S.
252 (1891). See M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §§ 119-119.2, at 510-13 (1970).
9. Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 400 (2d Cir. 1970) (emphasis
added).
10. P. Wittenberg, The Protection of Literary Property 88 (1968). Another definition
that has been suggested states that "Ewlith respect to a particular work embodied In concrete
form, or separable part of such work, there is, at any one time, in any particular jurisdiction,
only a single incorporeal legal title or property known as the copyright, which encompasses
all of the authorial rights recognized by the law of the particular jurisdiction with respect
thereto." Henn, "Magazine Rights"--A Division of Indivisible Copyright, 40 Cornell L.Q.
411, 417-18 (1955) (footnotes omitted).
11. R. De Wolf, An Outline of Copyright Law 76 (1925); see New Fiction Pub]. Co. v.
Star Co., 220 F. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). Contra, Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359
(S.D.N.Y. 1914). See also Hirshon v. United Artists Corp., 243 F.2d 640, 643 (D.C. Cir.
1957); Rohmer v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 862
(1946); Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 466, 467 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 323 U.S.
774 (1944); Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 282 F. 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1922),
cert. denied, 262 U.S. 755 (1923); Misbourne Pictures Ltd. v. Johnson, 90 F. Supp. 978
(S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 189 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1951).
12. Tully v. Triangle Film Corp., 229 F. 297, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); M. Nimmer,
supra note 8, § 132, at 581.
13. Independent Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 269 U.S. 459, 468 (1926);
Buck v. Elm Lodge, Inc., 83 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1936); Field v. True Comics, Inc., 89 F.
Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Local Trademarks, Inc. v. Powers, 56 F. Supp. 751, 752
(E.D. Pa. 1944); M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470 (E.D.S.C.),
aff'd mem., 2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924).
14. See Independent Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 269 U.S. 459, 466
(1926); Paul E. Hawkinson Co. v. Carnell, 112 F.2d 396, 398 (3d Cir. 1940); L.C. Page &
Co. v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196, 197 (2d Cir. 1936); Western Elec. Co. v. Pacent Re-
producer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 873 (1930); Field v.
True Comics, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 611, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Hoffman v. Santly-Joy, Inc., 51
F. Supp. 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); M. Nimmer, supra note 8, at 581.
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application of the theory of indivisibility is that the proprietor of the copyright
can sue the infringer without notifying the licensee that he is doing so and
without sharing the damages with the licensee, even though the latter may
have suffered economically as a result of the infringement. 5
Originally, the indivisibility theory grew out of the fact that the copyright
protected one right only-that of preventing an infringer from printing an-
other's manuscript without his permission."' However, as business practices
changed and the forms of entertainment became more varied, the average
copyright became a "bundle of rights." 17 It became more profitable for an
author to accept the best offer for each right, e.g., motion picture rights,
dramatic rights, serialization rights, recording rights, adaptation rights, tele-
vision rights, and book publication rights.18 The amendments to the American
Copyright Act,' 9 which was enacted in 1831, reflect this development of a single
right into a combination of rights.20 However, courts narrowly interpreted the
wording of the statute to mean that only the purchaser of all the rights in
one work may secure a valid copyright.21 The words in the statute relied
upon by the courts which have established the indivisibility rule, provide that
a copyright can be secured by "the author or proprietor" or by his "ex-
15. See M. Nimmer, supra note 8, § 119.31, at 517, citing Widenski v. Shapiro, Bernstein
& Co., 147 F.2d 909 (1st Cir. 1945).
16. Henn, supra note 10, at 411-16.
17. Comment, Indivisibility of Copyright-An Obsolete Doctrine, 37 U. Colo. L. Rev. 95
(1964).
18. See R. De Wolf, supra note 11, at 77-78; B. Ringer & P. Gitlin, Copyrights 16-17
(1963); Comment, supra note 17, at 97. If the right granted resulted in the creation of a
second work by the licensee, the licensee could get a fully protective copyright for himself
as proprietor of the new work. He can then bring an action for himself as proprietor of the
new work without joining the grantor of the right as co-plaintiff. See Comment supra note
17, at 97 n.24. An example of this would be a license granted to a movie producer by an
author of a novel to make a film adaptation of his book. The movie producer could obtain
a copyright of the film as proprietor of it.
19. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1964));
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
20. The Copyright Act of 1831 gave the author the right to print, reprint, publish, and
vend books, maps, charts and musical compositions. In 1856, the law was amended to
protect the author's dramatic rights. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138. In 1870,
the author's right to translate and dramatize his own work was recognized. Act of July 8,
1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198. In 1897, the right to present a musical composition from
the work was recognized. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, § 4966, 29 Stat. 481. The Copyright
Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1964), added several additional rights, including the right
to make records. From a single recognized right, therefore, the Copyright Act recognized
several rights, all with considerable monetary value to a successful author wishing to sell
one of those rights. See Comment, supra note 17, at 96-97.
21. See, e.g., Mlin v. R.H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260 (1903); Public Ledger Co. v.
New York Times Co., 275 F. 562 (SD.N.Y. 1921), afi'd, 279 F. 747 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 258 US. 627 (1922); New Fiction Publ. Co. v. Star Co., 220 F. 994 (S.D.N.Y.
1915).
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ecutors, administrators, or assigns." 22 These courts have held the word "pro-
prietor" to include "assignee" but not "licensee." 23 The Copyright Act of 1909,
which provided that the court has "power, upon bill in equity filed by any
party aggrieved, to grant injunctions to prevent and restrain the violation
of any right secured by said laws, " 24 bad been interpreted by one circuit in
a leading case to mean that "any party aggrieved" referred only to an "author
or proprietor, "25 and "any right" means only those rights embodied in a single
indivisible copyright.26
The courts gradually began to recognize the potentially harsh effects of a
strict application of the indivisibility rule. In two leading cases which upheld
the indivisibility rule, New Fiction Publishing Co. v. Star Co. 27 and Goldwyn
Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Corp.28 the plaintiffs were not the authors of
the works involved but were owners of part of the rights to the work. In each
of these cases, however, the court indicated, in dicta, that the result might
have been different had the author been the plaintiff.29
The doctrine of indivisibility of copyright was questioned by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons,
Inc.30 In Houghton, an injunction was granted to the plaintiff, who was the
publisher of Hitler's Mein Kampf, and who claimed that the copyright had
22. 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1964).
23. See cases cited note 21 supra.
24. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 36, 35 Stat. 1084, as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 112
(1964). The statute now reads: "Any court . . . shall have power, upon complaint filed by
any party aggrieved, to grant injunctions to prevent and restrain the violation of any right
secured by this title, according to the course and principles of courts of equity, on such
terms as said court . . . may deem reasonable." Note that the statute still contains the
words "any party aggrieved." 17 U.S.C. § 112 (1964).
25. Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 282 F. 9 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied,
262 U.S. 755 (1923).
26. Id. The statutory interpretation is explained at length by Professor Nimmer: "Since
the Copyright Act speaks of a single 'copyright' (17 U.S.C. § 10 (1964)] to which the au-
thor of a work is entitled, and refers in the singular to 'the copyright proprietor,' (17 U.S.C.
§§ 1-3, 7-10, 12, 14, 19, 21-22, 24-26, 28, 101, 107, 109, 214-15 (1964)] it is Inferred that
the bundle of rights which accrue to a copyright owner are 'indivisible,' that is, incapable
of assignment in parts." M. Nimmer, supra note 8, § 119.1, at 510; see M. Witmark & Sons
v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470, (E.D.S.C.), aff'd mene., 2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924);
New Fiction Publ. Co. v. Star Co., 220 F. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
27. 220 F. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
28. 282 F. 9 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 755 (1923).
29. In New Fiction, the district court had stated that "[lit will be understood that I
am not passing on the question which would be presented if Goodman were a party
plaintiff." 220 F. at 997. The court in Goldwyn said: "(Wie express no opinion in respect
of what the legal status of plaintiff would be if Mrs. Gunter [the author] were Joined as
party plaintiff, or if plaintiff should hereafter become a copyright proprietor .... " 282
F. at 12.
30. 104 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 597 (1939). The indivisibility theory
has been rejected several times recently. See note 71 infra. Courts have also made efforts to
avoid its strict application if the result would be too harsh. See note 47 infra.
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been assigned to it by the book's German publishers. The defendant was
publishing Mein Kampf, claiming that the work had fallen into the public
domain.3 ' In the course of its opinion, the court, in dicta, stated that: "The
desirability of recognizing partial assignments, as is usual in other forms of
property, would seem apparent; but perhaps under the statute we are held to
the view that 'the author's rights may not be divided except as the statute
recognizes a division."' 32
In Goodis the district court accepted the defendants' argument that the
copyright notice in the name of The Saturday Evening Post could not protect
Goodis' rights in Dark Passage.33 The court held that Curtis could not have
been a proprietor or an assignee because Goodis had already sold exclusive
rights to Warner Brothers. 34 Therefore, Curtis did not hold all the rights in
Goodis' work and could only have been a licensee, Thus, under the indivisibility
nile, Curtis' copyright of the entire magazine could not protect Goodis' rights
in his novel.38 Compliance with the copyright statute is required before or
simultaneous with the material's first publication3 7 If the proprietor of the
work fails to ensure such compliance his work falls into the public domain3 s
and his right to copyright the work is irretrievably lost. Being unpro-
tected on its first publication, Dark Passage was regarded as being "thrown
into the public domain as it appeared, installment by installment, in the
'Saturday Evening Post.' ,3 In coming to this conclusion, the district court
relied on the case of Morse v. Fields.40 In Morse, the court agreed with the
31. 104 F.2d at 307. There are four ways in which a work may fall into the public
domain, which means that it is then "available to everyone for use without permission or
payment ....
"(1) When the copyright owner has authorized publication of the work without the stat-
utory copyright notice, has failed to comply with certain other formal requirements [17
U.S.C. §§ 14, 16-18, 22-23 (1964)] or has expressly abandoned his copyright.
"(2) When the first 28-year term of copyright expires without renewal, or when the
maximum term of 56 years expires [17 U.S.C. § 24 (1964)] ....
"(3) When a work has been published that was written by a foreign author and does
not qualify for protection under the statute because of its author's citizenship or domicile,
or its place of first publication [17 US.C. § 9 (1964)].
"(4) When the work does not contain sufficient original material of creative authorship
to constitute the 'writing of an author."' B. Ringer & P. Gitlin, supra note 18, at 12-13.
32. 104 F.2d at 312, citing Public Ledger Co. v. New York Times Co., 275 F. 562, 564
(S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd, 279 F. 747 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 627 (1922).
33. 278 F. Supp. at 125.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 10-14 (1964) for requirements of compliance with the Act.
38. See note 31 supra.
39. 425 F.2d at 399; see Henn, supra note 10, at 428. 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1964) provides in
part: "No copyright shall subsist in the original text of any work which is in the public
domain, or in any work which was published in this country or any foreign country prior
to July 1, 1909, and has not been already copyrighted in the United States... 
40. 127 F. Supp. 63 (SMD.N.Y. 1954).
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plaintiff's theory that a general copyright in one issue of a magazine does
not protect the rights in an individual article unless the rights to the article
had been assigned to the publisher by the author before the publisher copy-
righted the whole issue.41 The reason for this was said by the court to be that
only a "proprietor" of a work can copyright it, that a person to whom the
rights to the work are assigned is designated a "proprietor," and that a mere
"licensee" cannot copyright a work.42
The court of appeals in Goodis rejected the district court's application
of the indivisibility rule.43 The most often cited policy reason for requiring
that the prospective plaintiff own no less than all the rights in a particular
work is the avoidance of several infringement actions, each begun by the
holder of one right in the work, against a single defendant, without joining
as co-plaintiff the author or proprietor of the copyrighted work.
44
The court, by looking to the purposes of the indivisibility rule, differenti-
ated "between applying the indivisibility doctrine to cases where the issue is
standing to sue for infringement and cases where the issue is protection of the
author's interest . . . ,,41 The court of appeals might continue to apply the
indivisibility rule in the former situation, but not in the latter.40 The court
indicated that it took this position because it wished to remedy the inherently
unjust situation that would have resulted had it found that Goodis' rights
in his work were lost to him forever because of a technical error committed
in the course of obtaining copyright. 47
We are loath to bring about the unnecessarily harsh result of thrusting the author's
product into the public domain when, as here, everyone interested in Dark Passago
41. Id. at 64-65.
42. Id.
43. 425 F.2d at 401.
44. Id., citing New Fiction Publ. Co. v. Star Co., 220 F. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). See gen-
erally H. Warner, Radio and Television Rights § 53 (1953).
45. 425 F.2d at 401; see Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
46. 425 F.2d at 400-01. The court "expressted] no opinion on whether a publisher In
Curtis' position could maintain an infringement action without joining the author." Id. at 401.
47. "Courts have been understandably reluctant to invoke the doctrine of indivisibility
where the author or proprietor of the work is the plaintiff and the result would be to deprive
the plaintiff of the fruits of his creative effort." Id. at 400. Courts have espoused various
theories in such cases in order to find for plaintiff-author and thus avoid such obviously
unjust results as occurred in Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899), a case in which Oliver
Wendell Holmes lost his common law copyright to "Autocrat of the Breakfast Table," and
Mifin v. R.H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260 (1903), in which the same author lost his copyright
to "Professor at the Breakfast Table." Both works were published in several installments in
the "Atlantic Monthly" without a proper copyright, before the works had been published
in a copyrighted book. Another case which is often cited as a too rigid adherence to statu-
tory copyright requirements is Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (No. 13,514) (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1853). For cases avoiding a strict interpretation of the copyright law, see Bisel v.
Ladner, I F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1924); Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921); T.B.
Harms & Francis, Day & Hunter v. Stern, 229 F. 42 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds,
231 F. 645 (2d Cir. 1916); Quinn-Brown Publ. Corp. v. Chilton Co., 15 F. Supp. 213
(S.D.N.Y. 1936).
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could see Curtis' copyright notice and could not have believed there was any in-
tention by Goodis to surrender the fruits of his labor.'8
The court stated that the decisions in New Fiction and Goldwyn did not
present a barrier to its conclusions, pointing out that both decisions specifically
did not rule on the applicability of the indivisibility rule in a case where the
author was the plaintiff.4 9
The court also cited as support for its holding, "modern business practices"50
and the "liberalizing spirit"51 embodied in the Copyright Act of 1909.P- Under
the Copyright Act of 1831, 53 an author obtained a copyright before pub-
lication by placing with the district court in the district where he was domi-
ciled a copy of the title of the work he had authored."! Under the Copyright
Act of 1909,r5 an author obtained copyright by publishing the work along
with a notice of his interest in it." The court regarded this alteration as
"critical," 5 7 explaining that, under the 1831 law, it was reasonable to re-
quire that only an author or a proprietor could obtain a copyright because
the author or proprietor would usually have exclusive possession of the work
before publication, and the copyright had to be secured before publication.58
Under the 1909 statute, however, copyright is obtained with the first pub-
lication of the work.5 9 Thus, where before 1909, the author obtained the
copyright himself, after 1909 the author would depend on the publisher to
secure the copyright. The result was that "[s]uddenly the author who might
previously have obtained copyright before publication had to guard against
any legal infirmity surrounding first publication which might throw his work
into the public domain." 9 To deprive the author of his rights in the work
48. 425 F.2d at 400.
49. See note 29 supra.
50. 425 F.2d at 403. It is often mentioned that the conception of the number of rights
which are protected by a copyright has been changed by modem business practices, which
change is not reflected in the Copyright Act of 1909. See notes 18 & 20 supra.
51. 425 F.2d at 402; see note 20 supra.
52. 425 F.2d at 401-03; see Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified as
amended, at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1964)).
53. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
54. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 4, 4 Stat. 436; see 425 Fa2d at 401.
55. See note 52 supra.
56. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1964).
57. 425 F.2d at 401.
58. Id.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1964).
60. 425 Fa2d at 401. This theory of indivisibility held pitfalls for the authors unversed
in copyright law. As Professor Henn stated: "The difficulty today is not that magazine
copyright law is indefinite, but that few realize how specific and technical such law is."
Henn, supra note 10, at 411.
Insofar as the publisher is concerned, all the contents, including the articles written by
various authors, are protected by a single registered copyright notice in the magazine along
with the author's name and the title of the piece which he has contributed to the Issue.
Copyright for the author will be obtained only if the article is published with a notice
1970]
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for his pre-1909 failure to fulfill his responsibility to copyright the work him-
self could be deemed fair. But to deprive the author of his rights in the work
for the publisher's error cannot be so easily justified.0 1
The court noted that its holding, not the district court's holding, is in con-
formity with the provisions of the proposed revision of the Copyright Act.02
The revised statute would provide that the author of a published magazine
article holds a copyright in the article distinct from the copyright of the
publisher 3 but that first publication in a magazine under a copyright notice
in the name of the publisher secures for the author a copyright in his article.0 4
The court considered the copyright notice in The Saturday Evening Post
to have been a "perfectly adequate"05, warning to the public that the material
was copyrighted by someone, that its author did not intend it to be in the
public domain, and that the copyright could not be infringed upon without
penalty."" The court concluded that "[a]Ithough placing a special notice in
the author's own name on each installment appearing in the magazine would
be a more careful practice than we find here, we do not think that failure
to do so, by itself, should cause an author to suffer forfeiture."07
The result in Goodis indicates a realistic willingness on the part of the
Second Circuit to limit an antiquated doctrine which has exhausted its pur-
pose,68 and to conform decisions in this area to the necessities of the modern
business world. As the Goodis court noted, Congress may soon pass a bill
which would be in accord with its holding.0 9 The indivisibility of copyright
doctrine, besides the unjust results it has produced, has created many problems
bearing the name of the copyright proprietor. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1964); see R. De Wolf,
supra note 11, at 88.
61. 425 F.2d at 401-03.
62. Id. at 402-03; see House Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2-3 (1967). See also the Hearings on H.R. 4347 Before a Subcomm. of the HouSe
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., sec. 8, pts. 1-3 (1966).
63. S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(c)-(d) (1967).
64. Id. § 403(a).
65. 425 F.2d at 403. The court concluded that the district court's granting of summary
judgment to defendants was erroneous. The court of appeals was reluctant to take so
broad an interpretation of the contract as to permit Warner Brothers to take characters
from Dark Passage and use them in any story line in which Warner Brothers chose to por-
tray Goodis' characters. The court of appeals expressed a concern about the pirating of
characters by persons other than the author and their use by such persons In works un-
authorized by the author. The court considered this a particularly important point because
of Goodis' possible plans to use his popular characters in sequels to Dark Passage. The
court of appeals therefore stated that it wished more information about the intent of the
parties, and the "general custom and expectations of authors and of members of the pub-
lishing, broadcasting, and film vocations." Id. at 406.
66. Id. at 403.
67. Id.
68. See text accompanying notes 8 & 43 supra.
69. See note 62 supra.
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in the areas of copyright recordation and taxes7 ° The rule has been rejected
recently in tax cases7' and has been criticized by legal writers as obsolete.m
A doctrine so striking in its artificiality, so plainly anachronistic, is properly
limited in application to cases where the plaintiff is not the author.
Jurisdiction-Long-Arm Statute-Participation in New York Auction
via Interstate Telephone Call by Non-domiciliary Held to Constitute
"'Transaction of Business" Within Mleaning of CPLR Section 302(a).-
Defendant, a California domiciliary, requested and received a catalogue from
plaintiff, a New York auctioneer. At defendant's request, plaintiff established an
open telephone line on the day of the auction between defendant, in Los
Angeles, and plaintiff's galleries in New York City. During the auction plaintiff's
employee apprised defendant of the bidding activity in New York and relayed
defendant's bids to the auction floor. Through the employee, the defendant
successfully bid for two paintings for an aggregate price of $96,000. When the
defendant refused to pay the sales price, plaintiff commenced an action in New
York by personally serving the defendant in California under New York's long-
arm statute.1 Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under rule 32 11(a) (8)
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, alleging a lack of personal jurisdiction.
The supreme court granted the motion to dismiss and the appellate division
affirmed, holding that the defendant had not transacted business in the state,
either personally or through an agent, within the meaning of Civil Practice Law
and Rules section 302 (a) (1).2 The court of appeals reversed, holding alterna-
tively that the defendant had either personally or through an agent transacted
business in New York and was therefore subject to in personam jurisdiction in
the state. Parke-Beriet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 NyE.2d
506, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1970).
70. See Comment, supra note 17, at 100-03. There is a Treasury ruling which rejects
the theory of indivisibility of copyright for income tax purposes. See Rev. RuL 409, 19S4-2
Cum. Bull. 174.
71. E.g., Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 466 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 323 U.S. 774
(1944); Gershwin v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 477 (CL CI. 1957); Herwig v. United
States, 105 F. Supp. 384, 389 (Ct. Cl. 1952); Joseph A. Fields, 14 T.C. 1202 (1930), afrd,
189 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1951).
72. See, e.g., note 17 supra.
1. N.Y. C.PL._R. § 302(a) (McKinney Supp. 1970) provides in part: "As to a cause of
action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exerie personal
jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or
through an agent:
"I. transacts any business within the state ... 
2. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 31 App. Div. 2d 276, 297 N.YS.2d 151 (Ist
Dep't 1969), rev'd, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.E.2d 506, 303 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1970).
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In 1877, Pennoyer v. Neff established the principle that before a court could
determine the personal liabilities or obligations of a defendant, he must first
be brought within its jurisdiction by service within the state, or by voluntary
submission to in personam jurisdiction. 4 A judgment entered by a court lacking
jurisdiction was void as violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.5
The narrow territorial limitations imposed on the jurisdiction of state courts
by the Pennoyer doctrine proved insufficient to meet the needs of a growing and
mobile population. As a result, the Pennoyer doctrine was expanded where some
reasonable basis-such as the constructive presence of the defendant within the
state0 or an act which implied consent to the jurisdiction of the forum 7-could
be found. Thus, doing business within the states was included under the "con-
structive presence" doctrine, to confer jurisdiction for all causes of action,
while non-resident motorist statutes were upheld on an "implied consent"
theory.9 However, it became increasingly clear that, in many instances, the courts
were relying on pure fictions to predicate jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries. 1°
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington" the Supreme Court swept aside
these fictions and prescribed a new standard for jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Stone,
writing for the majority, stated that due process only requires "that in order
to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' "12 The "minimum contacts" test is not simply mechanical.
It depends "upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4. Id. at 733.
S. Id.
6. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
7. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927); Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U.S. 41, 45
(1892); see Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
8. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1938); Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v.
McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915); Old Wayne
Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S.
602 (1899); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
9. In Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), defendant, a resident of Pennsylvania, was
involved in an automobile accident while driving in the state of Massachusetts. Massachusetts'
non-resident motorist statute stated that use of the state's highways by a non-resident
motorist was equivalent to an appointment of the registrar to accept process in any action
arising out of an accident or collision in Massachusetts. The Supreme Court held that "[tjhe
State's power to regulate the use of its highways extends to their use by non-residents as
well as by residents," and a state may validly require defendant to impliedly consent to
jurisdiction as a prerequisite to driving on its roads. Id. at 356 (citation omitted).
10. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569, 573 (1958) ; Note, Jurisdiction In
New York: A Proposed Reform, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 1412, 1413-15 (1969).
11. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
12. Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
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orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to insure."13 The Court did set some outer limits on the scope of juris-
diction. A nonresident having no contact with the forum was not subject to
service outside the state, while a non-resident deliberately conducting business
within the jurisdiction was.14
The first major interpretation of the "minimum contacts" test, McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co.,15 upheld a California court's assertion of jurisdiction over
a Texas insurance company in an action based upon an insurance contract mailed
to a California resident. The Texas company had never solicited nor done any
business in California apart from the single policy sued upon. Mr. Justice Black,
however, found these facts sufficient to predicate California jurisdiction: "It
is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract
which had substantial connection with that State."1 In determining that the
contract had a substantial connection with California, the Court noted that
the contract was delivered in California, the premiums were paid from California
and the insured was a resident of California when he died.lr Moreover, it found
"that California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress
for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims."' 8
The same Court in a subsequent decision, Hanson v. Denckla,'0 reminded the
states that the liberal approach taken in McGee did not signify the end of all
constitutional restrictions on a state's power to subject non-residents to the
jurisdiction of its courts.20 In Hanson, jurisdiction over a non-resident trustee
was denied where the sole contact with the forum state was correspondence be-
tween the trustee and the settlor of the estate who had moved to the forum state
after the establishment of the trust. Holding that the defendant did not have
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to predicate in personam juris-
diction, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, pointed out that due process still required
that the defendant perform some purposeful act within the forum state which
would subject him to its laws.21
The New York long-arm statute was originally modeled on the Illinois act,
13. Id. at 319.
14. Id. at 317-18; see McLaughlin, Practice Commentary to N.Y. C.P.L.I § 302
(McKinney 1963).
15. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
16. Id. at 223 (citations omitted).
17. Id. at 221-22.
18. Id. at 223. This statement could be construed as a deviation from the "fair play to
defendant" concept enunciated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US. 310, 316
(1945).
19. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
20. "[Ilt is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restric-
tions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. ... Those restrictions are more than a
guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of
territorial limitations on the power of the respective States? Id. at 251 (citation omitted).
21. Id. at 253; see McLaughlin, 1965 Supplementary Practice Commentary to N.Y.
C.P.LR. § 302 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
22. Second Preliminary Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure,
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and was designed "to take advantage of the constitutional power of the state
of New York to subject non-residents to personal jurisdiction when they commit
acts within the state. '23 The New York Court of Appeals, however, has added
the following caveat:
[D]efendants, as a rule, should be subject to suit where they are normally found, that
is, at their pre-eminent headquarters, or where they conduct substantial general
business activities. Only in a rare case should they be compelled to answer a suit in a
jurisdiction with which they have the barest of contact .... 24
Theoretically, a single transaction from which the cause of action arises is
all that is necessary to furnish a basis for personal jurisdiction over a non-
domiciliary.25 In this respect, the "transacts any business" criterion is far less
demanding than the "doing business" standard imposed under prior law. 20
There is no easy test to determine what activity is sufficient to satisfy the
"transacts any business" standard; each case must be decided on its facts.27
In commercial cases, however, the court of appeals "has indicated a tendency
to expand New York's jurisdiction and has been more liberal than lower
courts. s2 8  Commercial cases, unfortunately, are by no means pristine models
of certitude. For example, mere execution of a contract within or without the
state is not determinative of the existence of jurisdiction,2 though "the statu-
tory test may be satisfied by a showing of other purposeful acts performed by
the appellant in this State in relation to the contract, albeit preliminary or subse-
quent to its execution. 30
1958 N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 13, at 39. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968) provides
in part: "(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person
or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such
person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts
of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any such acts:
"(a) The transaction of any business within this State ....
See also Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-339.1 (Supp. 1969); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.181 (1969).
23. Second Preliminary Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure,
supra note 22.
24. McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 383, 229 N.E.2d 604, 607-
08, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34, 38 (1967) (citation omitted); see Wing v. Challenge Mach. Co., 23
F.R.D. 669, 672 (S.D. Ill. 1959).
25. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 456, 209
N.E.2d 68, 75, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 18, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965) (Estwing Mfg. Co. v.
Singer).
26. 1 J. Weinstein, H. Kom & A. Miller, New York Civil Practice 9 302.06 (1970);
McLaughlin, Practice Commentary to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, at 431 (McKinney 1963).
27. McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 381-82, 229 N.E.2d 604,
607, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1967).
28. 1 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, supra note 26, ff 302.06a, at 3-65; see Electronic
Devices, Inc. v. Mark Rodgers Assocs., 60 Misc. 2d 322, 323-24, 303 N.Y.S.2d 158, 160-61
(Yonkers City Ct. 1969), aff'd mer., 63 Misc. 2d 243, 311 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App. T. 1970).
29. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 456-57,
467, 209 N.E.2d 68, 75, 81-82, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 18, 26, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965)
(Estwing Mfg. Co. v. Singer); see Standard Wine & Liquor Co. v. Bombay Spirits Co., 20
N.Y.2d 13, 17, 228 N.E.2d 367, 369, 281 N.Y.S.2d 299, 301 (1967).
30. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 457,
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An interesting situation arises when the contract and negotiations occur
without the state, yet performance is to occur within New York and such per-
formance is not rendered.31 The court of appeals has stated, although not in a
contract case, that
[t]he failure of a man to do anything at all when he is physically in one State is not
an "act" done or "committed" in another State. His decision not to act and his not
acting are both personal events occurring in the physical situs. That they may have
consequences elsewhere does not alter their personal localization as acts.32
One would have to be present "to omit the act.33 In the converse situation, i.e.,
where the contract is negotiated and executed within the state and performance
is to be rendered without, personal jurisdiction has been upheld. 4 The mere
shipment of goods into the state,33 like the mere solicitation of business for an
out of state concern 6 would not satisfy the statutory requisite; yet "[i]t now
seems to be settled that advertising in New York, coupled with the shipment of
goods into this State, constitutes the transaction of business within the State
under CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 1) .... ,,37
A problem which is presented is whether an interstate telephone call consti-
tutes the transaction of business within the state in which the call is received.
In one case, where the defendant foreign corporation operated a hotel in New
209 N.E.2d 68, 75, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 18, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965) (Esthing Mfg. Co.
v. Singer) (footnote omitted).
31. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1314(b)'(1) (McKinney Supp. 1970), which deals with
the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in similar circumstances.
32. Platt Corp. v. Platt, 17 N.Y2d 234, 237, 217 N.E2d 134, 135, 270 N.YS.2d 403, 410
(1966).
33. Id. In VWrth v. Prenyl, S.A., 29 App. Div. 2d 373, 288 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1st Dep't
1968), promissory notes were executed outside of the country but made payable in New
York. The court held that there was no transaction of business in the state; accord, Hubbard,
Westervelt & Mottelay, Inc. v. Harsh Building Co., 28 App. Div. 2d 29S, 284 N.Y.S.2d 879
(1st Dep't 1967) (similar facts). Contra, G. Benedict Corp. v. Epstein, 47 Misc. 2d 316,
262 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (similar facts). See also Potter's Photographic Applica-
tions Co. v. Ealing Corp., 292 F. Supp. 92, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
34. Patrick Ellam, Inc. v. Nieves, 41 Misc. 2d 186, 245 N.Y.Sd 545 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
35. Kramer v. Vogl, 17 N.Y.2d 27, 31-32, 215 N.E.2d 159, 161-62, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900, 903-
04 (1966); see Potter's Photographic Applications Co. v. Ealing, 292 F. Supp. 92, 101 (E.D.
N.Y. 1968). But see Wilsey v. Gavitt, 49 Misc. 2d 744, 268 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. CL 1966)
(Defendant shipped "hundreds" of its products into the state).
36. A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, Lda., 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 266 N.YS2d 289 (1st Dep't
1966); Rose v. Sans Saud Hotel, Inc., 51 M~fisc. 2d 1099, 274 N.Y.S2d 1000 (Sup. CL
1966). But where the defendant or his agents come into the jurisdiction to solicit business,
the minimum contacts may have been established. National Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB
Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 US. 959 (1960); Buckley v.
Redi-Bolt, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 864, 268 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. CL 1966); Iroquois Gas Corp.
v. Collins, 42 Misc. 2d 632, 248 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Sup. Ct. 1964), alPd mem., 23 App. Div.
2d 823, 258 N.Y.S.2d 376 (4th Dep't 1965).
37. Naples v. Janesville Apparel Co., 29 App. Div. 2d 971, 972, 289 N.YS.2d 263, 271
(2d Dep't 1968) (citations omitted) '(dissenting opinion); see Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co.
v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 466-67, 209 N.E.2d 68, 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 26
(Singer v. Walker), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965) (Estwing Mfg. Co. v. Singer).
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Jersey, advertised in New York publications and maintained a local New York
phone number for direct calling to its out of state office, it was held not to have
"the minimum contacts in New York required for acquisition of jurisdiction
over it in personam .... ,,38 On the other hand, a more recent case, stated that
the maintenance of such a direct line combined with "a substantial business
with New York residents" would constitute the necessary minimum contactsA0
Clearly, however, the mere ordering of goods over the phone,40 like the mere
mailing of a contract offer into the state,41 would not confer jurisdiction under
section 302.
The New York long-arm statute provides that a non-resident need not have
been physically present in the state; jurisdiction over a defendant may be
predicated upon the acts of his agent. The term "agent" has been strictly con-
strued, i.e., a true, common law agency relationship must exist.42 A non-resident
principal will not be held to have transacted business within the state if such
business was done by an independent contractor.43
The agency requirement, in a long-arm case, is subject to another limitation
in a suit by the agent against his non-resident principal. If the agent wishes
to predicate long-arm jurisdiction on his own actions within the state, his true
agency must have been exclusive. 44 This exclusive agency rule is not applicable
to a situation where a third party sues a non-resident principal relying on the
agent's acts within the state.4
5
The Parke-Bernet court found that the defendant, Franklyn, had "pro-
jected himself into the auction room in order to compete with the other prospec-
38. Greenberg v. R.S.P. Realty Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d 690, 253 N.Y.S.2d 344 (2d
Dep't 1964) (citations omitted) (mere.).
39. Bard v. Steele, 28 App. Div. 2d 193, 195, 283 N.Y.S.2d 930, 933 (3d Dep't 1967).
40. M. Katz & Son Billiard Prods., Inc. v. G. Correale & Sons, Inc., 20 N.Y.2d 903, 232
N.E.2d 864, 285 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1967), aff'g mem. 26 App. Div. 2d 52, 270 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1st
Dep't 1966); Schroeder v. Loomis, 46 Misc. 2d 184, 259 N.Y.S.2d 42 (Sup. Ct. 1965); see
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Salisbury, 401 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1968).
41. A Millner Co. v. Noudar, Lda., 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1st Dep't
1966). Insurance Contracts are treated differently. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 59-a (McKinney
1966).
42. Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 244 N.E.2d 259, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1968).
43. Kirkland v. Sapphire Int'l Touring, Ltd. 262 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Standard
Wine & Liquor Co. v. Bombay Spirits Co., 20 N.Y.2d 13, 228 N.E.2d 367, 281 N.Y.S.2d
299 (1967); Miller v. Surf Properties, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 475, 151 N.E.2d 874, 176 N.Y.S.2d
318 (1958).
44. Orient Mid-East Lines, Inc. v. Bowen, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, Lda., 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1st Dep't 1966);
Hertz, Newmark & Warner v. Fischman, 53 Misc. 2d 418, 279 N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
1967).
45. Orient Mid-East Lines, Inc. v. Bowen, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 1149, 1152 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). In Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, the plaintiff was a third party who
asked the court to assert in personam jurisdiction over the defendant by virtue of tho de-
fendant's having transacted business in New York through an agent. These facts clearly take
this case out of the application of the exclusive agency rule. See Schneider v. J. & C. Carpet
Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 103, 258 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1965).
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five purchasers who were there," ' 6 and that "[t]his activity far exceeded the
simple placing of an order by telephone." 47 The telephone call, even though not
over a permanent direct line, was put through for the sole purpose of enabling the
defendant to actively participate in the auction. In short, it was a deliberate,
purposeful attempt by one not present in the jurisdiction to inject his presence
into the sale and to effectuate a purchase.48 This activity "affected not only the
plaintiff but all those who were in the auction room."40
In an alternative holding, the court stated: "[E]ven if we were to decide
that the defendant's personal participation in the auction did not amount to
the transaction of business here, there is substantial ground for concluding...
that Nash, who, of course, was physically present in the New York auction room,
was engaged as the defendant's agent at the time. °50 The court found that
Nash, an employee of the auctioneer had been "loaned" to Franklyn for the
duration of the sale and that his sole function was to serve as the link between
Franklyn and the auctioneer.51
The only feasible way in which the defendant could have effectively partici-
pated in the bidding was to have had control over and to have given directions
to one who was present at the auction. The defendant chose not to send someone
to New York for this purpose. Instead, the auctioneer furnished one of his
employees to act as the liason between Franklyn and the auction floor. Nash
had to have been under the control of the defendant; had Nash been subject
to the directions of the plaintiff, his loyalties would have collided. Nash was
therefore a true agent of Franklyn.5 2
In Parke-Bernet, there was a definite transaction of business by the defendant,
either in person or through an agent. The statement that Franklyn had "pro-
jected himself into the auction room"'53 does, however, pose some interesting
questions. For example, if three parties actively negotiate and execute a con-
46. 26 N.Y.2d at 18, 256 NY..2d at 508, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
47. Id. (citations omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id., 256 NY.2d at 508, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
50. Id., 256 N.E.2d at 509, 308 N.YS.2d at 341 (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 18-19, 256 N.E2d at 509, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 341. The loaned servant rule was
first enunciated in New York in Hartell v. Simonson & Son Co., 218 N.Y. 345, 113 N.. 255
(1916): "A servant in the general employment of one person, who is temporarily loaned to
another person to do the latter's work, becomes, for the time being, the servant of the
borrower ... 1" Id. at 349, 113 N.E. at 256.
52. The appellate division, in an opinion by Justice Tilzer, expressed its belief that Nash
"was not shown to have been acting for the defendant alone, solely in his interests and
subservient to his wishes." 31 App. Div. 2d 276, 278, 297 N.Y.S.2d 151, 153 (1st Dep't 1969)
(citation omitted), rev'd, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.E.2d 506, 308 N.YS.2d 337 (1970). The ap-
pellate division also considered the auctioneer to be the agent of the seller. Id. However, as
Justice MHcNally correctly pointed out in his dissenting opinion, Nash was not the auctioneer
but the plaintiff's employee. Id. at 280, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 155. Justice McNally believed that
Nash was the ad hoc employee of defendant Franklyn. Id.; see McLaughlin, Civil Practice,
1969 Survey of New York Law, 21 Syracuse L. Rev. 709, 721-22 (1969).
53. 26 N.Y.2d at 18, 256 N.E.2d at 508, 308 N.YS.2d at 340.
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tract on a tri-state telephone hookup, can either party be considered to have
injected himself into the jurisdiction of any other party for the purpose of a
suit based upon the resultant contract? It surely can be said that the state-
ments and proposals of such a party "affected" the other contractors.
Since the court found that a true agency existed between Franidyn and the
plaintiff's employee, it was not compelled to directly confront the agent-inde-
pendent contractor dilemma. However, the extent to which the court went to
find a true agency relationship indicates that the agent versus independent
contractor distinction is still valid, at least in long-arm suits. But logically it
should make no difference whether an agent or an independent contractor is
involved, rather the question should be whether the non-resident defendant
transacted any business either in person or through another. 4
Torts-Libel-Statute of Limitations under Uniform Single Publication
Act Runs from Date of Any Publication Defamed Person Chooses as
Representing Cause of Action.-Plaintiff filed suit against National Enquirer,
Best Medium Publishing Company, and United News Company, claiming
damages resulting from an allegedly defamatory article appearing in the issue
of The National Enquirer dated March 29, 1964. The printing of this issue had
commenced on March 10, 1964, in Tenafly, New Jersey. On that date, copies
were delivered to terminals in New York City for transportation to wholesalers
throughout the country. On March 12, 1964, copies were delivered to approxi-
mately 4,000 newsstands in the New York metropolitan area, and over 200,000
copies were placed on public sale. Copies of this issue did not go on sale at news-
stands in Philadelphia until March 14, 1964. This action, which came within the
Pennsylvania one year statute of limitations for libel,' was commenced on March
15, 1965.2 The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
on the ground that the one year statute of limitations barred the action. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff may choose
any publication as the single publication which represents his cause of action
under the Pennsylvania Uniform Single Publication Act.3 Dominiak v. National
Enquirer, 439 Pa. 222, 266 A.2d 626 (1970).
Under the traditional common law rule, every publication of a libel created
a separate and distinct cause of action upon which the defamed person could
54. In Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 NE.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d
41, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967), the court of appeals indicated that a true agency relation-
ship may not have to exist, at least in a "doing business" case. Id. at 538, 227 N.E.2d at 854,
281 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
1. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 31-32 (1953).
2. Since March 14, 1965, was a Sunday, the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act,
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 46, § 538 (1969), would permit filing of the action on March 15, 1965,
if March 14, 1964, were the date on which the one year statute of limitations commenced
to run.
3. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2090.1 (1967).
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bring an action and recover damages.4 The often cited case of Duke of Brunswick
v. Harmer5 allowed recovery where a single copy of a newspaper was sold more
than 17 years after the original printing and distribution. The rule which was
stated in this case is known as the "multi-publication rule." The development
of mass printing and distribution methods in the twentieth century led to the
rejection of the multi-publication rule by many jurisdictions,7 and the adoption
by those courts of the single publication rule.8 This doctrine states that "any
single integrated publication, such as one edition of a newspaper or magazine,
or one broadcast, is treated as a unit, giving rise to only one cause of action. ' *
The single publication rule amounts to a redefinition of the publication element
of a cause of action in libel.'0 Under the traditional definition, publication oc-
curs each time the libelous statement is communicated to a third person." Con-
sequently, every time a different person reads a defamatory article in a news-
paper, the plaintiff has a separate cause of action.j' The new definition states
not only that the composition, printing and distribution of a magazine or
newspaper is one act of publication,' 3 but also that the entire retail distribution
4. "Each time a libelous article is brought to the attention of a third person, a new
publication has occurred, and each publication is a separate tort. Thus, each time a
libelous book or paper or magazine is sold, a new publication has taken place which,
if the libel is false and unprivileged, will support a separate action for damages against
the seller." Restatement of Torts § 578, comment b at 200 (1938); accord, W. Odgers &
R. Ritson, Libel and Slander 493 (6th ed. 1929).
5. 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (Q.B. 1849).
6. See Annot., 58 A.L-R.2d 650 (1958). The enunciation of the multi-publication rule
in Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer was foreshadowed in a criminal case, Rex v. Carlile,
106 Eng. Rep. 624 (K.B. 1819), where it was held that separate publications of the same
material would support separate counts of criminal libel.
7. See Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 US. 858
(1949); Tocco v. Time, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 410 (EfD. Mich. 1961); Ogden v. Association of
the United States Army, 177 F. Supp. 498 (D.D.C. 1959); 48 Colum. L. Rev. 932 (1948);
59 Harv. L. Rev. 136 (1945). But see Winrod v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp.
249 (N.D. 111 1945); Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Waterman, 188 Ala. 272, 66 So. 16
(1913); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 138 Tex. 434, 160 S.W.2d 246 (1942).
8. Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Means v. MaicFadden
Publications, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Forman v. Mississippi Publishers
Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344 (1943); Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119,
81 N.E.2d 45 (1948); Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211, 4
N.Y.S2d 640 (4th Dep't 1938), aff'd mem., 279 N.Y. 716, 18 N.E.2d 676 (1939).
9. Uniform Single Publication Act, 9C Uniform Laws Ann. 171 (Commissioners' Prefatory
Note). See Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 US.
858 (1949); Tocco v. Time, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 410 (EfD. M Ich. 1961); Ogden v. Association
of the United States Army, 177 F. Supp. 498 (D.D.C. 1959); cases cited note 8 supra.
10. 59 Harv. L. Rev. 136 (1945).
11. W. Prosser, Torts § 108, at 787 (3d ed. 1964).
12. See Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (Q.B. 1849).
13. Wimrod v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249, 250 (N.D. III. 1945);
see Akin v. Time, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Ala. 1966); Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64
F. Supp. 671 (EfD. Pa. 1946), modified, 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334
19701
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
process is a continuation of that single publication.1 4 No subsequent individual
sale will create a separate cause of action or start the statute of limitations run-
ning anew, even though copies may remain on sale for days or even weeks,'1
and the publisher may mail replacement copies to subscribers, or single copies
on request.16
In 1952, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association recommended for adoption the Uniform Single Pub-
lication Act,17 which was subsequently adopted by seven states18 and the
Panama Canal Zone.' 9 The purpose of the Uniform Act is to "adopt the [single
publication] rule as it has been developed at common law in the states which
have accepted it."'2° Section 1 of the Uniform Act provides that "[n] o person
shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel or ... any other
tort founded upon any single publication.., such as any one edition of a news-
paper .... -21 Section 3 states that the Act "shall be so interpreted as to effect-
uate its purpose to make uniform the law of those states or jurisdictions which
enact it."' 22 Despite this attempt to produce uniformity, the interpretations
given the Act by the only two states which have thus far construed it in relation
to the statute of limitations are completely at odds.28
U.S. 838 (1948). Delivery to common carriers for shipment has generally not been held
to be publication so as to start the statute of limitations running. Zuck v. Interstate
Publishing Corp., 317 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1963); Osmers v. Parade Publications, Inc., 234
F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Tocco v. Time, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 410 (EfD. Mich. 1961);
Gaetano v. Sharon Herald Co., 426 Pa. 179, 231 A.2d 753 (1967). But see Backus v. Look,
Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
14. Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344 (1943); 59
Harv. L. Rev. 136 (1945); see Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1939);
Means v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Wolfson v.
Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (4th Dep't 1938), aff'd
mer., 279 N.Y. 716, 18 N.E.2d 676 (1939).
15. Ogden v. Association of the United States Army, 177 F. Supp. 498 (D.D.C. 1959);
Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953); McGlue v.
Weekly Publications, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass. 1946). But see Winrod v. McFadden
Publications, 62 F. Supp. 249 (NDl. Ill. 1945).
16. Polchlopek v. American News Co., 73 F. Supp. 309 (D. Mass. 1947); Backus v.
Look, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
17. Uniform Single Publication Act §§ 1-6.
18. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-651 (1956); Cal. Civ. Code § 3425.1 (West 1970);
Idaho Code Ann. § 6-702 (Supp. 1969); flI. Rev. Stat. ch. 126, § 11 (1969) ; N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 40-27-30 (1953); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02-10 (1960); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2090.1
(1967).
19. C.Z. Code tit. 4, § 4891 (1963).
20. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, supra note 9. The court in Hartmann v. Time, Inc.,
166 F.2d 127, 134 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948), concluded that although
there were no cases precisely on point, the Pennslyvania courts would follow the single
publication rule.
21. Uniform Single Publication Act § 1.
22. Id. § 3.
23. Compare Bell v. Roberts Bros. Furs, 240 Cal. App. 2d 284, 49 Cal. Rptr. 625
(Dist. Ct. App. 1966), with DominiRk v. National Enquirer, 439 Pa. 222, 266 A.2d 626
(1970).
Belli v. Roberts Brothers Furs,24 decided under the California Uniform
Single Publication Act,25 held that a single issue of a newspaper, although con-
sisting of several editions, is legally one publication which gives rise to but one
cause of action for libel.26 Such cause of action accrues at the time of first
publication.2 7 Where the proposed Uniform Act uses the word "edition" in
section 1, however, the California Uniform Act substitutes the word "issue."13
In Belli, the California Supreme Court interpreted this change to indicate that
the legislature intended section 1 of the Uniform Act to mean that a single
issue includes all editions.29 Therefore, in a single integrated publication, or
issue, the cause of action accrues upon the first general distribution, and the
statute of limitations runs from that date.30 This interpretation of the Uniform
Act is in accord with the interpretation of the common law single publication
rule in those states where that rule has been followed. 31
The holding in Dominiak is directly opposed to that of Bell*2 and to those
cases decided under the common law single publication rule. 3 Since the Belli
decision rested solely upon the interpretation of legislative intent manifested by
the substitution of the word "issue" for "edition,"3 4 its reasoning is not apposite
to Dominiak because the Pennsylvania statute retains the wording suggested
by the Commissioners. On the other hand, since the purpose of the Uniform Act
is merely to codify the single publication rule as it has been developed by the
courts,3 5 the cases decided under the common law provide an appropriate
standard for comparison.
The majority in Dominiak proceeded upon the assumption that "neither the
wording of the statute nor the policy behind it requires a holding that the period
of limitations begins to run from the time of the first publication."36 It argued
that such a rule, while protecting the interest of defendants through the opera-
tion of the statute of limitations, creates too great a potential for abuse by
unscrupulous publishers.3 7 By allowing the plaintiff to choose any publication
as the single publication which represents his cause of action, the purpose of
the Uniform Act, which is to protect the defendant from an endless running of
24. 240 Cal. App. 2d 284, 49 Cal. Rptr. 625 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
25. Cal. Civ. Code § 3425.1-S (West 1970).
26. 240 Cal. App. 2d at 289, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
27. Id.
28. 'No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel or ...
any other tort founded upon any single publication . . . such as any one issue of a
newspaper . . . ." Cal. Civ. Code § 3425.3 (West 1970). See text accompanying note 21
supra.
29. 240 Cal. App. 2d at 288-89, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
30. Id. at 289, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
31. See cases cited notes 8 & 9 supra.
32. The Dominiak opinion mentioned, but did not discuss the Belli decision. 439 Pa.
at 226, 266 A.2d at 629..
33. See cases cited notes 8 & 9 supra.
34. 240 Cal. App. 2d at 288, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
35. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, supra note 9.
36. 439 Pa. at 226-27, 266 A.2d at 629.
37. Id. at 228, 266 A.2d at 629.
CASE NOTES1970]
336 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
the statute of limitations,"8 will nonetheless be effectuated.8 This is accom-
plished because only those damages can be recovered which result from publica-
tions occurring within the statutory period of one year from the time of the
actionable publication.40 Thereafter, once the statutory period has passed from
the date of one publication, recovery for damages resulting from that publication
is forever barred.
In concurring, Justice Roberts argued that the statute of limitations begins
to run from the time that publication first reaches the allegedly defamed
person's "community." 41 The individual's community would vary in size depend-
ing on the "scope of his public stature. '4 2 Thus, a private citizen's community
might not extend beyond his home state, whereas a public figure's might include
the entire nation.48 Any publication which was too small or too distant to damage
the individual's reputation in his community would not start the statute of
limitations running.44
Justice Pomeroy's concurring opinion suggested taking the first publication
of the alleged defamation in the forum state as the single publication which
starts the statute running.45 While this would supply an unambiguous, readily
ascertainable criterion, it would create an injustice in the case of a plaintiff
who did not sue on a small distribution on the libelous statement in a far corner
of the state, only to discover that the statute of limitations had run by the time
the publication appeared in his area and he had suffered damage. 40
The holding of the court in Dominiak, by interpreting the Pennsylvania Uni-
form Single Publication Act so as to allow the defamed individual to choose
any publication as the one representing his single cause of action, does not
allow the Uniform Act to function adequately in relation to the statute of
limitations. The statute of limitations "is a statute of repose" 47 designed to
relieve the courts as well as the defendant from litigating stale claims long
after memories have faded, evidence has been lost, and witnesses have become
unavailable. 48 The situation in Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer,4 9 involving an
allegedly libelous statement nearly 18 years old, presents an extreme example
of the type of situation that the statute of limitations is designed to avoid. The
38. Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897, 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 858 (1949); Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 384, 400 (1948).
39. 439 Pa. at 227, 266 A.2d at 629.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 230, 266 A.2d at 630.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 231, 266 A.2d at 631.
46. See Tocco v. Time, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 410, 414 (E.D. Mich. 1961); 62 Harv. L.
Rev. 1041, 1043 (1949); cf. 439 Pa. at 228, 266 A.2d at 629.
47. Means v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 993, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1939);
Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211, 213, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640, 642
(4th Dep't 1938), aff'd mem., 279 N.Y. 716, 18 N.E.2d 676 (1939).
48. Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 123, 81 N.E.2d 45, 47 (1948).
49. 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (Q.B. 1849).
Dominiak rule does not permit the statute of limitations to run on the cause of
action as long as copies of the edition containing the defamatory article are
available for sale, for each new sale constitutes another publication on which
the plaintiff may rest his claim.
While the Uniform Act does not state that the single publication is necessarily
the first general distribution or public sale,50 this is implicit when the words
"single publication" are given the meaning which has evolved in the cases which
follow the common law single publication rule.6 ' Most of these cases approach
the problem in terms of when the cause of action accrues so as to start the
statute of limitations running. 2 With but a few e-xceptions,53 these cases have
held that the cause of action accrues on the date that copies are first placed
on sale to the general public.54 The cases are unanimous in holding that "the
cause of action accrues, for the purpose of the statute of limitations, upon the
first publication. . .."55
By holding that any single publication is actionable, the majority has actually
reverted to the traditional multi-publication ruleO5 while applying the Uniform
Single Publication Act. The only difference is that an action once brought would
end all litigation, since only one cause of action for damages is allowed.r But
unless and until that cause of action is brought, the statute of limitations will
start to run again with every sale. The majority in Dominiak failed to recognize
that the single publication concept is less a rule than a redefinition of "publica-
tion," at least as it applies to defamatory statements circulated in the mass
50. Uniform Single Publication Act § 1.
51. See cases cited notes 8 & 9 supra; Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 384 (1948).
52. See cases cited notes 8 & 9 supra.
53. A few cases have held that publication is complete when copies are placed with
a common carrier for delivery to wholesale distributors. Tocco v. Time, Inc., 195 F. Supp.
410 (E.D. Mich. 1961); Backus v. Look, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); National
Cancer Hosp. of America v. Confidential, Inc., 151 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. CL 1956).
54. E.g., Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671 (ED. Pa. 1946), modified, 166 F2d
127 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948); leans v. MacFadden Publications,
Inc., 25 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Belli v. Roberts Bros. Furs, 240 Cal. App. 2d 284,
49 Cal. Rptr. 625 (Dist. CL App. 1966); Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 195 Miss.
90, 14 So. 2d 344 (1943) ; Gaetano v. Sharon Herald Co., 426 Pa. 179, 231 A.2d 753 (1967).
55. Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671, 679 (ED. Pa. 1946), modified, 166 Fad
127 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948); accord, Forman v. Missppi
Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344 (1943); Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 298
N.Y. 119, 81 N.E.2d 45 (1948); see Tonsmeire v. Tonsmeire, 285 Ala. 454, 233 So. 2d 465
(1970). For a discussion of date of publication problems arising in regard to conflict of
laws, see Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1947); Annot, 58 A.L.R.2d
650 (1958); 48 Colum. L. Rev. 932 (1948). For a discussion regarding venue problems,
see Hartmann v. Time, Inc., supra; Age-Herald Pub. Co., v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40,
92 So. 193 (1921); Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344
(1943); Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S.W. 496 (1903); Gaetano v.
Sharon Herald Co., 426 Pa. 179, 231 A.2d 753 (1967). For an excellent summary of
problems related to date of publication generally, see 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1041 (1949).
56. See authorities cited note 6 supra.
57. 439 Pa. 222, 266 A.2d 626; see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2090.1 (1970).
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mediaY8 By construing the single publication rule, as codified in the Uniform
Single Publication Act, to mean simply that there can be only one cause of
action, but that the cause of action can be based on any publication, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has ignored the entire line of common law decisions 0
in which the single publication doctrine was evolved.
The single publication rule as applied by the common law cases may deprive
a plaintiff of his cause of action if he has relied on the date printed on the cover
of the publication 0 or the date of distribution in his area0 ' as the time from
which to measure the statute of limitations. The results in these cases, however
unfortunate, do not counterbalance the positive effects of the rule, which are
to establish a definite, clearly identifiable date of publication, and to bring the
statute of limitations into operation. The rule of the Dominiak case, while
changing the seemingly unfair results mentioned above, does not permit the
statute of limitations to function in this type of case because it prevents the
establishment of the date from which to measure it by leaving the choice of the
controlling publication date to the plaintiff. Thus while the common law single
publication rule is consistent with the policy of the statute of limitations, the
Dominiak holding prevents the statute of limitations from operating at all under
the Pennsylvania Uniform Publication Act.
Torts-Nuisance-Air Pollution-Permanent Damages Awarded in Lieu
of Injunction.-The New York Supreme Court determined that defendant
cement company's plant damaged plaintiffs' properties and created a nuisance
by its release of dirt, smoke, and vibrations. Temporary damages1 were awarded,
but an injunction was denied in view of defendant's large investment in its
plant, its contribution to the local economy, and its financial aid to education
through the payment of school and property taxes.2 The total damages to the
plaintiffs were found to be $535 per month.3 In addition, the supreme court set
permanent damages totaling $185,000 for all the plaintiffs in the event that any
or all of them should agree with the defendant to accept such damages with
58. 59 Harv. L. Rev. 136 (1945). The older rule still applies to letters, writings and
other personal publications. See Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 384, 400 (1948).
59. See cases cited notes 8 & 9 supra.
60. Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1946), modified, 166 F.2d
127 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948); Winrod v. McFadden Publications,
Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249 (ND. Ili. 1945); Means v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 25 F. Supp.
993 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
61. Akin v. Time, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 306 (NJ). Ala. 1966); Forman v. Mississippi
Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344 (1943).
1. Temporary damages may be awarded "[w]hen an injury is intermittent, and able to be
stopped, as in the case of occasional trespasses on land .... " H. Oleck, Damages to Persons
and Property § 61, at 34 (rev. ed. 1961). See generally C. McCormick, Damages § 127 (1935).
2. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 1025, 287 N.Y.S.2d 112, 114 (Sup.
Ct. 1967), aff'd, 30 App. Div. 2d 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452 (3d Dep't 1968), rev'd, 26 N.Y.2d
219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
3. 55 Misc. 2d at 1025-26, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 115.
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the provision that no subsequent action would be brought by the plaintiff or
plaintiffs against the defendant.4 The appellate division affirmed the lower
court's decision 5 and the plaintiffs appealed. The New York Court of Appeals
reversed and remitted the cases to the supreme court directing it to grant an in-
junction which would be vacated upon the payment by the defendant of
permanent damages.6 Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257
N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
The term "nuisance" does not readily lend itself to an accurate and compre-
hensive definition.7 The vagueness and uncertainty surrounding the term are due
to the fact that it "has come by a series of historical accidents to cover the
invasion of different kinds of interests, and ... to refer to various kinds of con-
duct on the part of the defendant."3 As the law of "nuisance" developed, two
separate principles or types of nuisance emerged: 9 (a) private nuisance, which
is the unreasonable use of one's property which substantially interferes with
another's use of his property,10 and (b) public nuisance, which is an unreason-
able interference "with the general well-being, health or property rights of
neighbors or of people generally."11 While the definitions of nuisance are many
and varied, it is generally agreed that it is the invasion of a legal right."
4. Id. at 1026, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 115-16.
5. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452 (3d Dep't 1968),
rev'd, 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
6. "'Permanent damages' are those awarded when the cause or injury is frozen and will
always remain as a diminution of the value ...of the injured property .. . ." H. Oleck,
Damages to Persons and Property § 49, at 32 (rev. ed. 1961). See generally C. McCormick,
Damages § 127 (1935).
7. Accordingly, the first "significant attempt to determine some definite limits to the types
of tort liability" associated with the term nuisance was by the American Law Institute in the
Restatement of Torts § 822 (1939). W. Prosser, Torts § 87, at 592 (3d ed. 1964).
8. W. Prosser, supra note 7, at 593.
9. Id.
10. Heeg v. Licht, 80 N.Y. 579, 582 (1880); see Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 198
Misc. 291, 95 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd mem., 279 App. Div. 8061 109 N.Y.S.2d
719, 279 App. Div. 807, 110 N.Y.S.2d 456 (2d Dep't 1952), aifd, 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E2d
421 (1953). See generally W. Prosser, Torts § 90 (3d ed. 1964). In discussing the proposition
that one is required to make a reasonable use of his property, the court in Bohan v. Port
Jervis Gas-Light Co., 122 N.Y. 18, 25 N.E. 246 (1890), said: "(A] reasonable use can never
be construed to include those uses which produce destructive vapors and noxious smells,
and that result in material injury to the property and to the comfort of the existence of
those who dwell in the neighborhood." Id. at 24, 25 N.E. at 247.
11. Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Van Tassell, 7 Misc. 2d 643, 645, 166 N.Y.S.2d 458, 462
(Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'd mem., 6 App. Div. 2d 880, 177 N.Y-S2d 1010 (2d Dep't 1958). The
most significant difference between public and private nuisance is that the correction of a
private nuisance is through civil action taken by the injured person, whereas a public nuisance
may only be corrected by public authority. However, one who suffers injury "beyond that
of the general inconvenience to the public at large" may recover damages or obtain an
injunction. Graceland Corp. v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 7 App. Div. 2d 89, 91, 180
N.YS.2d 644, 646 (1st Dep't 1958), afPd mem., 6 N.Y.2d 900, 160 N.E2d 926, 190 N.Y..2d
708 (1959); see Callahan v. Gilman, 107 N.Y. 360, 14 N.E. 264 (1887). See generally W.
Prosser, Torts § 89 (3d ed. 1964).
12. Kay v. Pearliris Realty Corp., 106 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444 (Sup. Ct. 1951). "Nuisance]
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Once it has been found that a nuisance does in fact exist, the issue to be re-
solved is the type of relief that is to be granted. Generally speaking, two types
of relief are available: a suit in equity for abatement, or an action at law for
damages.1 s
The New York courts have long recognized the right of citizens to remain
free from the effects of air and water pollution and have awarded injunctions to
abate such pollution where it amounted to a nuisance.1 4 In the 1872 case of
Hutchins v. Smith' 5 it was found that in burning stone into lime, defendant
caused dust, gas, and smoke to enter plaintiff's premises resulting in an inter-
ference with the enjoyment of his property. Such interference amounted to a
nuisance for which the plaintiff was awarded a perpetual injunction enjoining
the defendant's maintenance thereof.'0 In discussing what constitutes a nuisance,
the court, quoting Catlin v. Valentine,'7 said: "'[I] t is not necessary that the
noxious trade or business should endanger the health of the neighborhood. It is
sufficient if it produces that which renders the enjoyment of life and property
uncomfortable.' "'18
In 1876, the New York Court of Appeals in Campbell v. Seaman'0 considered
the question of a nuisance caused by brick burning.20 The most important issue
in this case was whether the court should restrain the nuisance or allow plaintiff
to recover damages. In examining this question the court noted that in the past
the writ of injunction had been rarely granted in nuisance actions until the
denotes the wrongful invasion of a legal right or interest. It comprehends not only such
invasion of property but of personal legal rights and privileges generally." Sweet v. State,
195 Misc. 494, 500, 89 N.Y.S.2d 506, 514 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
13. 42 N.Y. Jur. Nuisances § 44 (1965). By statute in New York, the plaintiff will be
entitled to a judgment for damages or abatement or both if the court concludes that his
rights have been invaded by a nuisance caused by defendant. N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law
§ 841 (McKinney 1963).
14. English courts also recognized the problem of air pollution at a very early date.
In 1610, the Kings Bench granted an injunction against the maintenance of a hogsty which
corrupted the air. William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1610).
15. 63 Barb. 251 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872).
16. Id. at 259.
17. 9 Paige 575, 576 (N.Y. Ch. 1842).
18. 63 Barb. at 255. In answer to defendant's contention that his trade was a lawful
one, the court followed the rule used in the English cases-that any lawful business may be
a nuisance if conducted in a manner which renders another man's property less enjoyable.
Id. at 256. See, e.g., People v. Transit Dev. Co., 131 App. Div. 174, 115 N.Y.S. 297 (2d
Dep't 1909); Bloss v. Village of Canastota, 35 Misc. 2d 829, 232 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Sup. Ct.
1962).
19. 63 N.Y. 568 (1876).
20. In a similar case, Mulligan v. Elias, 12 Abb. Pr. (ns.) 259 (Brooklyn City Ct. 1872),
the court restrained a chemical plant from operating in such a manner as to emit a sul-
phurous gas which destroyed the vegetation on plaintiff's premises and irritated the throats
of those who breathed it, adding that it was no answer to the complaint for defendant to
show that the fumes tended to neutralize a malaria existing in the area. Id. at 268-69.
plaintiff's right had been established in a court of law,2 1 but stated that a suit
at law was no longer necessary and "the right to an injunction ... [was] just
as fixed and certain as the right to any other provisional remedym- 2 Further-
more, the writ of injunction could be demanded in order "to prevent irreparable
injury, interminable litigation and a multiplicity of suits."a
The court also decided that it was not necessary to show that the nuisance
was continuous and the injury more than occasional since the nuisance had
occurred often enough to cause considerable damage.24 Nor was it material
that the defendant operated the brick yard prior to plaintiff's use of his
lands.2 5 Accordingly, "[o]ne cannot erect a nuisance upon his land adjoining
vacant lands owned by another and thus measurably control the uses to which
his neighbor's land may in the future be subjected ." 2  Noting that courts will
sometimes refuse to issue an injunction where the damage to the plaintiff is
small and the damage to the defendant would be large should the nuisance
be enjoined, the court concluded that such was not the situation before it;
plaintiff's damages were substantial and the issuance of the injunction was
proper.2
7
By the turn of the century it had been established that the fact that the
polluter was a large business enterprise would not affect the law relating to the
ownership and use of property. In Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co.,2 which involved the
pollution of a stream by a salt manufacturer, the court of appeals held that it
would not permit substantial injury to be inflicted upon neighboring property
for the purpose of enabling a large industry to develop. "-' Reversing the lower
court's denial of injunctive relief and ordering a new trial, the court noted,
"the fact that [a large manufacturer] has invested much money and employs
many men in carrying on a lawful and useful business... does not change the
rule .... 20
21. 63 N.Y. at 582. See generally Huckenstine's Appeal, 70 Pa. 102 (1872).
22. 63 N.Y. at 582.
23. Id.; see, e.g., Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 321, 58 N.E. 142, 147 (1900);
see also Little Falls Fibre Co. v. Henry Ford & Son, Inc., 249 N.Y. 495, 164 N.E. SS8
(1928), aff'd, 280 U.S. 369 (1930).
24. 63 N.Y. at 583.
25. Id. at 584.
26. Id. It is interesting to note that the court took into consideration the aesthetic values
which might be lost if an injunction were not granted: "Every one has the right to surround
himself with articles of luxury, and he will be no less protected than one who provides
himself only with articles of necessity... [TIhe law will not compel a person to take money
rather than the objects of beauty and utility which he places around his dwelling to gratify
his taste or to promote his comfort and his health." Id. at 583.
27. Id. at 586; see, e.g., Howland v. Union Bag & Paper Corp., 156 Misc. 507, 282 N.Y.S.
357 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
28. 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142 (1900).
29. Id. at 322, 58 N.E. at 148. See also Wheatley v. Chrisman, 24 Pa. 298 (1855), where
the court said: "The necessities of one man's business cannot be the standard of another's
rights in a thing which belongs to both." Id. at 302.
30. 164 N.Y. at 322, 58 N.E. at 148. "An equity court is not bound to issue an injunc-
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In 1904, in Friedman v. Columbia Machine Works & Malleable Iron Co., a8
the question of money damages as opposed to injunctive relief was squarely met
by the appellate division. Upon defendant's suggestion that the plaintiff only
be allowed money damages, the court stated that "the recovery of daily damages
is not an adequate remedy for one whose rights of property are continually
invaded."3 2
Shortly after Friedman, the leading case of Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper
Co.33 was decided. The plaintiff, a lower riparian owner, sought to have the
defendant pulp mill enjoined from discharging its liquid effluent into the creek
which passed through the plaintiff's land. Plaintiff's injury caused by the pollu-
tion was set at $100 per year by the appellate division. 4 In deciding the case,
the court of appeals noted that it was difficult to lay down a rule with respect to
the determination of when an injunction should issue, especially where the
injury to the plaintiff was small compared with the large loss to the defendant
which would result from an injunction. 5 The court also noted that the setting
aside by the appellate division of the injunction granted by the trial court was
induced by this consideration."6 By rejecting a course of action calling for a
balancing of injuries, 7 the court reinstated the injunction declaring that:
Although the damage to the plaintiff may be slight as compared with the defendant's
expense of abating the condition, that is not a good reason for refusing an injunction.
Neither courts of equity nor law can be guided by such a rule, for if followed to its
logical conclusion it would deprive the poor litigant of his little property by giving
tion when it will produce great public or private mischief merely for the purpose of
protecting a technical or unsubstantial right.
"When, however, the damages are substantial, the fact that an injunction would Interfore
with great industries, the development of natural resources, or with the plans of a great cty
for drainage, is not a sufficient reason for relaxing the ordinary rules governing the rights
of riparian owners of land." Warren v. City of Gloversville, 81 App. Div. 291, 293, 80 N.Y.S.
912, 913-14 (3d Dep't 1903) (citations omitted). See also Kennedy v. Hoog, Inc., 48 Misc.
2d 107, 111, 264 N.Y.S.2d 606, 613 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd mem. in part, rev'd mom. in part
on other grounds sub nom. Kennedy v. Moog Servocontrols, Inc., 26 App. Dlv. 2d 768,
271 N.Y.S.2d 928 (4th Dep't 1966), aff'd mem., 21 N.Y.2d 966, 237 N.E.2d 356, 290 N.YS.
2d 193 (1968).
31. 99 App. Div. 504, 91 N.Y.S. 129 (2d Dep't 1904).
32. Id. at 506, 91 N.Y.S. at 130. Since the court found that the complaint was purely
equitable in nature, the defense that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law was held
to be insufficient. Id. at 506-07, 91 N.Y.S. at 130-31.
33. 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913).
34. Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 145 App. Div. 1, 3, 129 N.Y.S. 391, 393 (3d Dep't
1911) (per curiam), rev'd in part, 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913). In Whalen, the court
of appeals considered damages of $100 per year to be substantial. 208 N.Y. at 4-5, 101 N.E,
at 806. The Boomer court, by implication, also regarded this sum as substantial damages.
26 N.Y.2d at 224, 257 N.E.2d at 872, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
35. 208 N.Y. at 4, 101 N.E. at 805-06.
36. Id. at 4, 101 N.E. at 805.
37. Id. This practice has been referred to as a balancing of conveniences. G. Clark,
Equity § 215 (1954).
CASE NOTES
it to those already rich. It is always to be remembered in such cases that "denying the
injunction puts the hardship on the party in whose favor the legal right exists instead
of on the wrongdoer."38
The recent case of Caliendo v. McFarland 39 perhaps best typifies the con-
sistency which the courts have exhibited in following Whalen. Upon granting
an injunction to restrain members of a labor union from pursuing a course of
conduct which contravened the union's constitution and by-laws, the court
noted that "given a substantial... right, equity will zealously protect it against
invasion, and the absence of material injury to the one seeking to enforce such
a right, or the amount of inconvenience or monetary loss to the other party
will have little weight in the settlement of the issue .... 40 The court added
that equity will not be swayed by a balancing of injuries where the legal right
involved is substantial.41
In Boomer the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged that the defendant
cement plant was an obvious source of air pollution2 and that such pollution
resulted in a nuisance substantially damaging the plaintiffs.43 The court also
recognized the great public concern over air pollution but limited itself to
resolving only the case before it, declining to become involved with broader
public issues.44 The majority believed that much more research was needed to
ameliorate the present pollution problem, and that it was not the judiciary's
place to spur such research; 45 furthermore, air pollution involved an area
beyond the realm of one private suit.4 6
The court of appeals noted that the trial court based its denial of the injunc-
tion on the "qarge disparity in economic consequences of the nuisance and of
the injunction.147 This reasoning, the court continued, could not "be sustained
without overruling a doctrine which has been consistently reairmed in several
38. 208 N.Y. at 5, 101 N.E. at 806 (citation omitted). This principle has since become
well established in New York law. See, e.g., Spadafora v. Nolan Corp, 66 N.Y.S2d 127, 129
(Sup. CL 1946). In Hard v. Blue Points Co., 170 App. Div. 524, 525, 156 N.Y.S. 465, 466
(2d Dep't 1915), the court held that "Etihe fact that defendant has large capital here in-
vested, so that it will sustain loss by having to withdraw its encroachment, does not justify
the trespass or warrant withholding an injunction." (citation omitted).
39. 13 Misc. 2d 183, 175 N.YS.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1958). As suggested by this case, the
principle announced in Whalen is so well-imbedded in New York law that it is not limited
to cases involving nuisances.
40. Id. at 191, 175 N.Y.S2d at 877 (citations omitted).
41. Id., 175 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
42. 26 N.Y.2d at 222, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 309 N.YS.2d at 314.
43. Id. at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 872, 309 N.YS.2d at 315.
44. According to Judge Bergan who wrote the majority opinion: "A court performs
its essential function when it decides the rights of parties before it .... It is a rare exercise
of judicial power to use a decision in private litigation as a purposeful mechanism to achieve
direct public objectives greatly beyond the rights and interests before the court." Id. at
222, 257 N.E2d at 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
45. Id. at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
46. Id.
47. Id., 257 N.E2d at 872, 309 N.YS.2d at 315.
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leading cases ... and which has never been disavowed here .... "48 But, to
follow the rule of those cases literally would mean closing down the plant im-
mediately. 40 Realizing that the defendant's investment in the plant amounted
to more than $45,000,000 with an employment of more than 300 people, the
court considered this to be too drastic a remedy.50 It was the court's belief that
justice would be done by awarding permanent damages to the plaintiffs and
granting an injunction until such payment was made."' A major factor in
selecting this remedy was that it would terminate the lawsuit, for both plain-
tiffs and their grantees would be precluded from future recovery because the
defendant would have obtained, by the payment of permanent damages, a
"servitude on the land."52
The court chose not to select a frequently used equitable remedy-an injunc-
tion to take effect at a future date53-even though this type of relief has often
been granted in order to afford defendants the opportunity to remedy existing
nuisances.54 This solution was disposed of by concluding that technological
breakthroughs with respect to controlling pollution were unlikely to be developed
within a short period of time, for example, 18 months, and that the parties would
be back in court again.55 Furthermore, "[i] f at the end of 18 months the whole
industry has not found a technical solution a court would be hard put to close
down this one cement plant if due regard be given to equitable principles."'
In holding that the immediate closing of the plant would be too drastic a
remedy, 57 the court seems to have taken into consideration the large number of
48. Id.
49. Id. at 225, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 226, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
52. Id. at 228, 257 N.E.2d at 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 319. For an explanation of this concept
by Justice Douglas see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-63 (1946).
53. 26 N.Y.2d at 225, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 316-17; see, e.g., Schwarzen-
bach v. Oneonta Light & Power Co., 207 N.Y. 671, 100 N.E. 1134 (1912) (mem.). Note
that this is the type of relief suggested by Judge Jasen in his dissenting opinion. 26 N.Y.2d
at 231, 257 N.E.2d at 877, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
54. Sammons v. City of Gloversville, 175 N.Y. 346, 67 N.E. 622 (1903) (injunction sus-
pended for one year); Western N.Y. Water Co. v. City of Niagara Falls, 91 Misc. 73, 154
N.Y.S. 1046 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd mem., 176 App. Div. 944, 162 N.Y.S. 1149 (4th Dep't
1917), aff'd mein., 226 N.Y. 671, 123 N.E. 894 (1919) (injunction suspended for six months).
See also Garvey v. Long Island R.R., 159 N.Y. 323, 54 N.E. 57 (1899).
55. 26 N.Y.2d at 225-26, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
56. Id. at 226, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
57. It should be noted that in a number of lower court cases damages were awarded
along with an injunction which was to be vacated upon payment of the damages by the
defendant to the plaintiff. Unlike Boomer, however, the immediate and unequivocal closing of
the defendants' plants was considered to be an improper remedy in view of the fact that
it would foreclose an important public purpose. E.g., Slobodkina v. Village of Great Neck,
285 App. Div. 908, 138 N.Y.S.2d 28 (2d Dep't 1955) (mem.) (village sewage disposal plant);
Weinberg v. Rodgers & Hagerty, Inc., 100 Misc. 329, 165 N.Y.S. 483 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd men.,
179 App. Div. 906, 165 N.Y.S. 1118 (2d Dep't 1917) (construction of subway). See also
Kraatz v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 20 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Sup. Ct. 1940), appeal dismissed
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people employed by the defendant 58 and, in this respect, its reasoning appears
to be inconsistent with the earlier portion of its opinion in that it did not
limit its decision to only the parties before it.59 In addition, the court's belief
that the risk of being required to pay permanent damages to injured landowners
is by itself an effective spur to research for pollution control 0 seems to ignore
the fact that, in most instances, it is generally less expensive to pay damage
claims than to install pollution control devices.6'
It is interesting to note that the cases which the court cited to support its
award of permanent damages (thereby imposing a servitude upon the land) are
not analogous to the situation in Boomer.62 These decisions were made on the
ground of public interest 63 in the continued operation of the particular plants.
In short, the plaintiffs' properties in these cases were subjected to the nuisances
because the defendants' operations were necessary for the public good. In
applying this "public interest" standard to a private cement company, the
court in Boomer seems to have ignored the fact that such a servitude should
only be placed on land by and for the public, not by and for a private person
or corporation.64 As Judge Jasen pointed out in his dissenting opinion:
mem., 4 App. Div. 2d 826, 166 N.Y.S.2d 489 (4th Dep't 1957); De Muro v. Havranek, 153
Misc. 787, 275 N.Y.S. 186 (Sup. Ct. 1934). In a court of appeals case, the lower court was
directed to find permanent damages which were to be awarded to the plaintiff in the event
that the defendant could not find the means to avoid polluting a river. An injunction was
withheld (unless the defendant failed to pay the damages) because an essential municipal
activity was involved. Squaw Island Freight Term. Co. v. City of Buffalo, 273 N.Y. 119,
7 N.E.2d 10 (1937).
58. 26 N.Y.2d at 225, 257 NE.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
59. See note 44 supra and text accompanying notes 44 & So supra.
60. 26 N.Y.2d at 226, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.YS.2d at 317.
61. See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert, 324 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 910 (1964), where the manager of defendant's aluminum production plant,
when questioned as to his reasons for not employing more effective fluoride controls, re-
marked: "'It is cheaper to pay claims than it is to control fluorides." See also Schmitz,
Pollution, Law, Science, and Damage Awards, 18 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 454, 460 (1969). The
Supreme Court in Harrisonville v. WS. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 339 (1933),
although denying the injunction, noted that the permanent damages payable to the plaintiff
"would obviously be small as compared with the cost of installing an auxiliary plant" to
reduce the effluent flowing onto plaintiff's land. The injunction was denied because an
important public interest would be prejudiced if the injunction were granted and because
the plaintiff's injury was "wholly financial." Id.
62. See Judge Jasen's dissenting opinion, 26 N.Y.2d at 230, 257 N.E2d at 876, 309
N.Y.S.2d at 321.
63. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. WJ. & MS. Vesey, 210 Ind. 338, 200 N.E. 620
(1936) (gas manufacturing plant); Kentucky-Ohio Gas Co. v. Bowling, 264 Ky. 470, 95
S.W.2d 1 (1936) (power plant and pumping station of a gas supplier); Ferguson v. Village
of Hamburg, 272 N.Y. 234, 5 N.E.2d 801 (1936) (operation of a dam to supply the
inhabitants of a village with water); Pappenheim v. Metropolitan El. Ry., 128 N.Y. 436, 28
N.. 518 (1891) (elevated railroad); City of Amarillo v. Ware, 120 Tex. 456, 40 S.W.2d
57 (1931) (operation of a city system of storm sewers).
64. New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 343, 1 N .-2d 153,
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This kind of inverse condemnation . . .may not be invoked by a private person
or corporation for private gain or advantage. [It] should only be permitted when the
public is primarily served in the taking or impairment of property. ... The promo-
tion of the interests of the polluting cement company has, in my opinion, no public use
or benefit.0 5
In view of the present pollution problem, the one optimistic point of the
court's decision is its statement that "[t]he limitation of relief granted is a
limitation only within the four corners of these actions . . . ,"0 adding that
public agencies are not foreclosed from seeking proper relief.0 7 This language
seems to indicate the court's desire to mitigate the possible effects of its decision
and to place the major burden of enforcing pollution abatement solely on
government agencies rather than on the private citizen. 8 However, this is a
small consolation to the plaintiffs who can no longer fully enjoy their proper-
ties.6 9
In Boomer, the New York Court of Appeals was faced with a situation upon
which the case law was very lucid. By virtue of the doctrine set forth in
Whalen, an unconditional injunction should have been granted. But to do so,
the court reasoned, would have unfairly placed the burden of solving the air
pollution problem on one cement plant. Thus faced with both the restraint of
stare decisis and its resultant harshness in the present situation, the court chose
to compromise. 70 While the effect of the Boomer decision on Whalen is unclear,71
156 (1936); Pocantico Water Works Co. v. Bird, 130 N.Y. 249, 258-59, 29 N.E. 246, 248
(1891); see Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc. v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 342, 347, 183
N.E.2d 684, 686, 229 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (1962); U.S. Const. amend. V; N.Y. Const. art. I,
§7.
65. 26 N.Y.2d at 230-31, 257 N.E.2d at 876, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 321 (citations omitted).
Judge Jasen further noted the significance of the fact that the New York State Consti-
tution provides for private property taken for public use (art. I, § 7, subd. [a]), but con-
tains no provisions for taking property for a private use. 26 N.Y.2d at 231, 257 N.E.2d at
876-77, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 321-22.
66. Id. at 226, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
67. Id.
68. Recently, the Michigan State Legislature passed into law an act, effective October 1,
1970, which provides, inter alia, that any person may maintain an action for declaratory and
equitable relief against the state or any person or entity in order to protect the air, water
and other natural resources from pollution. The act further provides for temporary and
permanent equitable relief, or the imposition of conditions requiring the defendant to protect
the environment. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 691.1201-07 (Supp. 1971).
69. The importance of being able to enjoy one's home was pointed out in Miranda v.
Buffalo Gen. Elec. Co., 140 Misc. 267, 251 N.Y.S. 510 (Sup. Ct. 1931): "The rights of
plaintiffs to the peace and quiet of their established homes are not trifling, inconsequential,
technical nor insubstantial privileges." Id. at 269, 251 N.Y.S. at 512.
70. Implicit in the court's opinion seems to be the desire not only to avoid a harsh
result in Boomer but also to avoid setting forth a decision which could be used as an
instrument by neighboring land owners to close down cement plants throughout the state.
71. See, e.g., Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment; E-=MC2: Environment
Equals Man Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, Symposium: Law and the Environment,
55 Cornell L. Rev. 674, 702 (1970), where the author is of the opinion that Whalen has
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it seems that the court at least made an attempt not to destroy the well-
established doctrine announced there;72 nevertheless, it would appear that the
court has departed from Whahen and in the process has weakened the status
of that case. However, the rule in .Boomer would seem to be limited to those
cases where, as here, the pollution cannot be abated by the most advanced
pollution control devices73 as opposed to situations where some corrective
remedy is available even though it may be costly to the defendant.
Despite the limitations placed on the decision, the court has hindered the
fight against the ever increasing destruction of the environment. As Judge
Jasen aptly pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the court is "compounding
the magnitude of a very serious problem" 74 and is "licensing a continuing
wrong.17 5 In view of the slow bureaucratic movements of government regula-
tory agencies, if similarly situated plaintiffs are to be precluded by this decision
from obtaining unconditional injunctions, the incentive for pollution abatement
research would seem to be diminished. In light of the present environmental
crisis, a better and more responsive decision in Boomer would have been
achieved by the issuance of a permanent injunction to take effect at a future
date in order to afford the defendant plant the opportunity to abate the
nuisance. This course of action would have been consistent with Whalen and
still would have avoided the harsh remedy of an immediate shutdown. At the
same time, greater pressure would have been placed upon the defendant to find
a method to prevent further air pollution.
Selective Service-Conscientious Objector-Registrant Need Not ShoW
Religious Training and Belief in order to Qualify for the Exemption.-
Petitioner, a non-religious conscientious objector, applied on dearly secular
grounds for the statutory exemption' from service in the armed forces. On
the basis of his own testimony, petitioner's appeal board denied his request
and classified him 1-A. 2 Petitioner was drafted, but refused to submit to in-
duction into the armed forces. He was convicted of violating the Universal
been overruled by the decision in Boomer. Judge Jasen also implies in his dissenting opinion
that Whalen has been overruled: "I see grave dangers in overruling our long-established
rule of granting an injunction . . . ." 26 N.Y.2d at 230, 257 N.E.2d at 876, 309 N.Y.S2d
at 320.
72. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
73. The trial court in Boomer stated that the cement company had taken "every available
and possible precaution to protect the plaintiffs from dust." 5S Misc. 2d at 1024, 287 N.Y.S.2d
at 113.
74. 26 N.Y.2d at 229, 257 N.E.2d at 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
75. Id. at 230, 257 NXE.2d at 876, 309 N.YS.2d at 321.
1. Universal Military Training and Service Act § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1964),
as amended (Supp. V, 1970).
2. Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 398 U.S. 333
(1970).
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Military Training and Service Act, Section 12(a)3 and received a three year
sentence. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit which found that petitioner had no religious basis for his conscientious
objector's claim and that a religious basis was essential to the validity of the
claim.4 The United States Supreme Court reversed, interpreting the conscientious
objector provision as exempting from military service all objectors whose be-
liefs, stemming from the registrant's moral, ethical or religious conviction, were
of such intensity that they could not, as a matter of conscience, engage in war.
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
The conscientious objector exemption in Section 6(j) of the Universal Mil-
itary Training and Service Act embodies a policy which, in the United States,
is as old as conscription itself.5 In considering the background of Welsh, how-
ever, it is only necessary to trace the exemption from 1940, when Section
5(g) of the Selective Service Act of 1940,6 Section 6(j)'s immediate prede-
cessor, was enacted. Prior to 1940, federal conscientious objector legislation
had invariably required membership in a pacifist sect.7 The Selective Service
Act of 1940 broadened the scope of the exemption by eliminating this require-
ment and exempting any claimant who could establish his eligibility "by
reason of religious training and belief."8
3. 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1964).
4. 404 F.2d at 1081-82.
5. See Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of Torcaso v.
Watkins, 51 Geo. L.J. 252, 256-63 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Conklin].
6. Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889.
7. See Conklin 260. There is substantial legislative precedent for exemptions for con-
scientious objectors which dates from the pre-Revolutionary period. The Continental
Congress passed such a resolution in 1775 and the exemption had previously been enacted
into various state and colonial statutes. The policy was continued through the Civil War
in state statutes until finally preempted by the Federal Draft Act in 1864. Act of Feb. 24,
1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 9, which exempted members of religious sects opposed to the bear-
ing of arms. The Draft Act of 1917, Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78, exempted
objectors who were affiliated with a "well-recognized religious sect or organization at present
organized and existing and whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to partici-
pate in war in any form .... " Although the Act was phrased in terms of religious objectors,
the Secretary of War directed local boards to consider personal scruples against war as suf-
ficient to entitle the objector to the exemption. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 171
(1965) ; see Conklin 256-63. The constitutionality of the Draft Act and its conscientious
objector provision was sustained in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389-90
(1918). The Court also held that Congress may compel individuals to perform military
service in valid exercise of the War power implemented through the "necessary and proper"
clause. Id. at 377-78. The Court rather tersely dismissed petitioners' constitutional objection
to the conscientious objector provision, which was based on the first amendment, stating:
"[Wle think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more." Id. at 390.
8. Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889. The Act provided: "Nothing con-
tained in this Act shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant
training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States who, by reason of
religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."
Id. It is interesting to note that various religious and civic organizations denounced the
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There was a significant conflict within the circuits regarding the inter-
pretation of the phrase. The Second Circuit, in United States V. Kauten,9
opted, in dicta, for an expansive reading of this language, and suggested that
eligibility for the exemption was purely a function of intensity of belief.20 The
Ninth Circuit rejected this broad interpretation in Berman v. United States,1
construing the phrase so as to distinguish an intensely held secular scruple
against war from one based on the objector's belief in a relational duty to his
God.' 2 The Berman majority expressly excluded even the highest and most
deeply held secular conviction from qualifying for the exemption because,
without reference to a diety, it cannot be termed "religious" as that word is
used in the statute.13
Congress was aware of the Berman-Kauten controversy when drafting the
Selective Service Act of 1948.14 Section 6(j) of the Act read:
Nothing contained in this title. . . shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to partici-
pation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological,
or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.15
narrow language of the bill at House and Senate hearings on the legislation. The ACLU pro-
posed that the bill be amended as follows: "Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed
to require any person to be subject to training . . . who is conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form...." Hearings on H.. 10132 Before the House Comm.
on Military Affairs, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 191 (1940) [hereinafter cited as ACLU Proposal].
See generally Conklin 269-70.
9. 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943). This expansive interpretation was upheld in two later
Second Circuit cases. United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1944),
petition for cert. dismissed, 328 U.S. 817 (1946); United States ex rel Phillips v. Downer,
135 F.2d 521, 523-24 (2d Cir. 1943).
10. See 133 F.2d at 708.
11. 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
12. Id. at 380. The Berman Court, (id. at 381), referred to Chief Justice Hughes' dis-
senting opinion in United States v. McIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), overruled on other
grounds, Girouard v. United States, 328 US. 61, 69 (1946), which stated: "The essence
of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation." 283 U.S. at 633-34.
13. 156 F.2d at 381. The dissent in Berman opted for an expansive nontheistic interpreta-
tion of the "religious training and belief" requirement of § $(g). Id. at 382.
14. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604, as amended 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 4S1-73
(1964), as amended (Supp. V, 1970).
15. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612-13, as amended SO U.S.C. § 456(j)
(1964), as amended (Supp. V, 1970) (emphasis added). It should be noted that the 1967
amendment to the Act, subsequent to the Court's decision in United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965), deleted reference to a "Supreme Being, ' but continued to provide that
"religious training and belief" does not include "essentially political, sociological or philo-
sophical views, or a merely personal moral code."
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It is inferable, at least, that Congress chose the Berman reading of the 1940
statute.16 The phrase "by reason of religious training and belief," construed
as in Berman, was able to withstand constitutional attack in the Second,17
Third,' and Ninth19 Circuits, but seemed somewhat vulnerable in light of
more recent first amendment decisions of the Supreme Court.20 In Torcaso
v. Watkins,21 for example, the Constitution of the State of Maryland forbade
the exacting of all religious oaths except those which affirmed the declarant's
belief in God. Petitioner refused to declare his belief in God, a requisite to
his taking the office of notary public, and was denied the appointment. The
Court, in voiding the Maryland oath requirement, stated:
[N]either a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person
"to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass
laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and
neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against
those religions founded on different beliefs. 22
The first amendment problems implicit in a literal interpretation of Sec-
tion 6(j) are compounded by certain Due Process difficulties under the fifth
amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in deciding United
States v. Seeger,23 wrote that the exemption was violative of Due Process in
that it established an "impermissible classification124 by discriminating be-
tween theistic and nontheistic forms of belief.
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Seeger,25 resolved the constitutional
problems surrounding the Berman position by stating that the essential hold-
ings of Berman and Kauten were in substantial agreement since both held
that the exemption must be denied to those whose beliefs are "political, social
16. S. Rep. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948). "This section ...reenacts sub-
stantially the same provisions as were found in subsection 5 (g) of the 1940 act. Exemption
extends to anyone who, because of religious training and belief in his relationship to a
Supreme Being, is conscientiously opposed to combatant military service or to both com-
batant and noncombatant military service. (See United States v. Berman, 156 F. (2d) 377,
certiorari denied, 329 U.S. 795.)"
17. United States v. Bendik, 220 F.2d 249, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1955).
18. United States v. De Lime, 223 F.2d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 1955).
19. Etcheverry v. United States, 320 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 930
(1963) ; Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13, 23-24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882
(1956); George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445, 452 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843
(1952).
20. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962);
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
21. 367 U.S. 488 (1961); see Conklin 276-81.
22. 367 U.S. at 495 (footnotes omitted). The Court acknowledged the existence of certain
nontheistic religions in this country: Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture and Secular Human-
ism. Id. at 495 n.11.
23. 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
24. Id. at 854.
25. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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or philosophical in nature, rather than religious."26 The Court, relying on
Senate Committee language to the effect that the 1948 Act reenacted the 1940
provision with only minor "technical amendments," then substituted the Kau-
ten reading of Section 6(j) for the Congressionally sanctioned Berman read-
ing of the provision.27 The Seeger Court expanded the original Berman con-
notation of the term "religious" to encompass grounds for objection that could
"fairly be said to be 'religious. "28 The Court said that the "Supreme Being"
clause29 was to be broadly interpreted in relation to the "religious training
and belief" clause as being "no more than a clarification" 30 so that "[a] sincere
and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel
to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemp-
tion."3' Under this test, the Seeger Court excluded only those whose convic-
tions stemmed from a "merely personal moral code" 32 and atheists whose
scruples were derived from political, social or philosophical grounds.as
It was not until Welsh v. United States3 4 came before the Supreme Court
that the basic difficulty with the exemption was confronted, i.e., that the sin-
26. Id. at 178.
27. Id. at 178-79. The Court noted that the Senate Committee cited to Berman in its
report, which seemingly indicated Congress' approval of that case's interpretation of the
phrase "by reason of religious training and belief." Id.; see S. Rep. No. 1268, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1948). The Court circumvented this obstacle by implicitly accepting the Kauten
approach and stating: "[Rather than citing Berman for what it said 'religious belief' was,
Congress cited it for what it said 'religious belief' was not." 380 US. at 178.
28. 380 U.S. at 180 (emphasis added). The Seeger Court resorted to the writing of
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (1957), and Bishop John Robinson, Honest to God
(1963), to support its contentions. 380 U.S. at 180-81.
29. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1964), as amended (Supp. V, 1970); see text accompanying
note 15 supra.
30. 380 U.S. at 179.
31. Id. at 176.
32. Id. at 173, 186. The Court held that in order to be denied an exemption, the regis-
trant's "merely personal moral code" had to be "in no way related to a Supreme Being:'
Id. at 186.
33. Id. at 173; The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 flarv. L. Rev. 56, 115 (1965);
34 Fordham L. Rev. 129, 133 (1965). Seeger thus eliminated the danger of a classification
favoring theistic religion over nontheistic religion and ensured equal protection for all
religionists no matter what their particular belief. That this equal protection did not extend
to sincere non-religious objectors was not a concern of the Seeger Court. That Court was
careful to limit itself to the facts at hand, where none of the individuals involved could
be called atheists, ie., their beliefs could "fairly be called religios." 380 U.S. at 173-74, 193
(Douglas, J., concurring). The Court did not construe the statute vis-.-vis religionists and
atheists (i.e., non-religious objectors) but between beliefs which, although divergent as to
the nature of a Supreme Being and that Being's attributes, could be brought within the ambit
of the Court's definition of "religious." Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 353 n.7 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
34. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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cere non-religious objector remained vulnerable to conscription.3 Justice
Black, with three Justices concurring in his opinion,80 resorted to statutory
interpretation to save Section 6(j) from the Establishment Clause. 7 The
Court observed that an individual's objection to war in any form, although
purely moral and ethical in derivation and content, may impose upon him a
duty of conscience, occupying in the life of that individual "a place parallel
to that fulfilled by . ..God" in conventional religionists.88 Citing the Seeger
parallism test, Justice Black extended Seeger, holding that: "Because his
beliefs function as a religion in his life, such an individual is as much entitled
to a 'religious' conscientious objector exemption . ..as is someone who de-
rives his conscientious opposition to war from traditional religious convic-
tions."3 9 Justice Black exempted as "religious" even those "who hold strong
beliefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even those whose conscien-
tious objection . ..is founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of
public policy."140 The test now required only a certain intensity of conviction,
and excluded the lukewarm, opportune and none else.41
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan chose to confront the constitu-
tional problems presented by the Berman position regarding Section 6(j),
challenging what he considered the evasiveness of Justice Black's interpreta-
tion of the exemption and the dissent's protestations of the Berman position's
validity. He first rejected Justice Black's interpretation of "religious training
and belief." 42 In Harlan's opinion, the basic question was "whether Welsh's
opposition to war is founded on 'religious training and belief' and hence belief
in relation to a 'Supreme Being' as Congress used those words."148 Admitting
these terms to be plastic44 in connotation, Justice Harlan nonetheless indi-
cated that, judging from legislative history and usage, these words "fall short
of enacting a broad policy of exempting from military service all individuals
35. See Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, 398 U.S. at 344-67. See also United States v.
Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943); ACLU Proposal 191.
36. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Douglas concurred in Justice Black's opinion. Justice
Harlan concurred only in the result, differing radically with Justice Black's analysis. Jus-
tice White's dissent drew the support of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart. Justice
Blackmun did not participate in the decision. The result was a 5-3 decision for the reversal
of petitioner's conviction.
37. 398 U.S. at 343-44 (Black, J.); see id. at 345-47 (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 340.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 342.
41. Id. at 342-43. Once a registrant shows the requisite degree of "sincere belief," It
follows a fortiori that his views cannot be "'essentially political, sociological, or philosophi-
cal'" and certainly not "a 'merely personal moral code.'" Id. at 343.
42. Id. at 345-46.
43. Id. at 346.
44. See id. at 352.
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who in good faith oppose all war."'45 In Harlan's view, the statute is a child
of Berman, and as such, at most, exempts only religious objectors, while
equally sincere nonreligionists are subject to conscription. 40 This was the plain
intent of Congress,47 and therefore the exemption is at cross purposes with
the Establishment Clause as not being "wholly 'neutral.' "4 8 Congress need not
exempt at all, but once having done so, it cannot draw invidious distinctions
between religious belief, theistic or nontheistic, on one hand and purely secular
conviction on the other.49
Justice Harlan proceeded to show by "equal protection mode of analysis"50
that, because of this establishment, the statute fails to include nonreligious
objectors within its scope, and is thus underinclusive and constitutionally in-
firm.51 He would cure this defect by extending the statute's coverage to include
the aggrieved petitioner and his fellows, thus preserving the exemption and
providing Welsh with a remedy-the reversal of his conviction . 2
Justice Harlan supported this position with the severability clause appended
to the 1948 Act,5 3 which he considered to be a legislative authorization to the
45. Id. at 347. The result of Justice Black's interpretation, according to Justice Harlan,
was a completely transformed statute without reference to the distinction between a re-
ligiously derived belief and one which is secular in nature, a meaning contrary to a plain
reading of the statute. Id. at 351-54. The semantic agility of Justice Black's opinion is
attributable, he noted further, to "a groping to preserve the conscientious objector exemption
at all cost." Id. at 354.
46. Id. at 349-50.
47. Id. at 354, 359.
48. Id. at 356.
49. Id. Justice Black was, according to Justice Harlan, keenly aware of these considera-
tions, and his construction has so emasculated the provision that it is constitutional in ap-
plication, but not by its own terms. Such an interpretation is, in Harlan's view, contrary
to settled law. Id. at 355. Justice Harlan quoted Justice Cardozo: "'A statute must be
construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitu-
tional, but also grave doubts upon that score. . . .' But avoidance of a difficulty will not
be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion. Here the intention of the Congress is re-
vealed too distinctly to permit us to ignore it because of mere misgivings as to power. The
problem must be faced and answered." Id. at 355, quoting from Moore Ice Cream Co. v.
Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933) (citation omitted); see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288
(1936). But see Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) ; Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957).
50. 398 U.S. at 357; see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 US. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
51. 398 U.S. at 362.
52. Id. at 362-63.
53. Id. at 364; Act of June 19, 1951, ch. 144, § 5, 65 Stat. 88. The section reads: "If
any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held
invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act . . . shall not be affected thereby." See
United States v. Jackson, 390 US. 570, 585 n.27 (1968); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation
1970]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
courts to preserve the remains of infirm legislation where feasible.54 He also
noted that the extension was in the spirit of the time-honored practice of ex-
empting such objectors from duty in the armed services, a tradition which, he
felt, should not be lightly regarded.e5
Justice White, writing for the dissenters, would have affirmed the trial
court's conviction of the petitioner on the ground that his claim did not con-
form to the legislative standard in Section 6(j) of the 1948 Act.50 The dis-
senters agreed with Justice Harlan that the legislative history of the section
showed that it was the intent of Congress to exempt only religious objectors
as that term is conventionally understood.57 However, the dissent disagreed
with Justice Harlan's analysis and would have upheld the constitutionality of
the exemption. Justice White assailed the petitioner's standing to raise the
constitutional question. He argued that, even if the exemption were invalid,
why should such invalidity create a draft immunity for the petitioner, from
whom the statute expressly withheld the exemption? 9 Justice White went on
to view the section as a valid attempt by Congress to avoid certain Free Ex-
ercise difficulties6 ° implicit in forcing religious objectors to engage in combat
in defiance of their religious scruples. 1 Recognizing, further, that the exemp-
tion presents aspects of an establishment of all religion over non-religious
belief, 62 Justice White asked, in effect, which policy shall prevail: the pre-
vention of establishment of religion or the provision for its free exercise?03
Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932). See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508 (1928).
54. 398 U.S. at 364-65.
55. Id. at 365-66.
56. Id. at 368.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 368-69. The dissent quotes from United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960),
to support its contention: "[Olne to whom application of a statute is constitutional will
not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitu-
tional." Id. at 21, quoted in 398 U.S. at 368-69. Note however that Justice White assumed
that the denial of the exemption to petitioner was constitutional. But petitioner is a member
of the very class injured by the exemption through a denial of equal protection. It would
seem that under this standard, the only persons who would have standing would be re-
ligious objectors who would be eligible for the exemption under the statute. It is unlikely
that such persons would challenge the constitutionality of a statute which grants them their
exemption.
60. 398 U.S. at 369-71.
61. Id. at 369-70.
62. Id. at 370.
63. Id. at 370-72.
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He suggested that a statute is violative of the Establishment Clause only
when its sole purpose is, in fact, religious establishment.G Justice White
stated that the exemption in Section 6(j) is no more of an unconstitutional
establishment than those sustained in Sherbert v. Verner65 and Follett v. Town
of McCormick66 where Free Exercise policies were controlling considerations.
It was appropriate, according to Justice White, even if not constitutionally
necessary, for Congress, in the exercise of its power to raise armies, imple-
mented through the "necessary and proper" clause,"e to take account of Free
Exercise policies and exempt "religious" objectors.69 The Court, suggested
White, without derogating its power as final arbiter of the Constitution, must
respect the judgment of Congress in these matters, so long as it can "'perceive
a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.' "TO
Justice Black's analysis is logically consistent, given the expansive connota-
tion it attributes to the phrase "by reason of religious training and belief."
But this is not entirely accurate as is cogently demonstrated by Justice Har-
lan. It seems that Justice Black has engaged in semantics in order to reach
the desired result-the preservation of the conscientious objector exemption
and its extension to all non-religious objectors. Justice Harlan's analysis is
more direct in that he confronts the constitutional problems presented and
attempts to resolve them. His resort, however, to contrivance-equal protec-
tion analysis and the extension remedy-to preserve and extend the exemp-
tion is as inadequate a solution as that proposed by Black and his adherents.
The ultimate result is the same-a statute which does not mean what it
purports to say. The relative ease with which both opinions transform the
section is dangerous precedent. The dissent is superficially appealing, but fails
to recognize that Free Exercise values need not necessarily conflict with the
Establishment Clause, especially in a case such as this. By avoiding all re-
ligious classification and adopting a sincerity test as the sole criterion for
exemption, the conflict is resolved. This is Justice Black's test and that ap-
64. Id. at 369.
65. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). A state statute required claimants for unemployment com-
pensation to be able to work and to be available for work and to accept suitable work
when offered by the state employment office or an employer. The statute also exempted
religionists from having to accept work on Sunday, the conventional Sabbath. Petitioner,
a Seventh-Day Adventist, was held to be exempt from having to accept work on Saturday,
the Adventist Sabbath.
66. 321 U.S. 573 (1944). A flat tax levied on all book sellers was held invalid when
applied to a seller of religious publications as an unwarranted interference with the free
exercse of religion.
67. 398 US. at 370.
68. US. Const. art. I, § 8.
69. 398 U.S. at 371.
70. Id. quoting from Kafzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966).
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proved as well by Justice Harlan. It could well form the basis for future
legislation.7 '
71. The Welsh decision is inconclusive as to the future, especially in regard to the selec-
tive objector cases, United States v. Gillette, 420 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 399 U.S.
925 (1970); Negre v. Larsen, 418 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 399 U.S. 925
(1970). These cases came before the Court in the October 1970 Term and involve objection
to participation in a particular war (Viet Nam). The cases have a different statutory nexus
than Welsh in that their solution seems to lie in an interpretation of the phrase "is con-
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form," rather than the phrase "by reason
of religious training and belief." 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (Supp. V, 1970). Only the broadest
interpretation of the entire provision affords any common ground between Welsh and the
selective objector cases. See United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969),
appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
